ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This course on Actions to be taken to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery was developed for the International Maritime Organization by the Anglo-Eastern Maritime Training Centre, Mumbai.

IMO wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the Anglo-Eastern Maritime Training Centre, Mumbai for their provision of expert assistance and valuable cooperation in support of this work.

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MSC.1/Circ.1334 of 23 June 2009

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- Flow diagram for attacks in coastal waters
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MSC.1/Circ.1335 of 29 September 2009

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Foreword

Since its inception the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has recognized the importance of human resources to the development of the maritime industry and has given the highest priority to assisting developing countries in enhancing their maritime training capabilities through the provision or improvement of maritime training facilities at national and regional levels. IMO has also responded to the needs of developing countries for postgraduate training for senior personnel in administrations, ports, shipping companies and maritime training institutes by establishing the world Maritime University in Malmö, Sweden, in 1983.

Following the adoption of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW), a number of IMO Member Governments had suggested that IMO should develop model training courses to assist in the implementation of the Convention and in achieving a more rapid transfer of information and skills regarding new developments in maritime technology. IMO training advisers and consultants also subsequently determined from their visits to training establishments in developing countries that the provision of model courses could help instructors improve the quality of their existing courses and enhance their implementation of the associated Conference and IMO Assembly resolutions.

In addition, it was appreciated that a comprehensive set of short model courses in various fields of maritime training would supplement the instruction provided by maritime academies and allow administrators and technical specialists already employed in maritime administrations, ports and shipping companies to improve their knowledge and skills in certain specialized fields. With the generous assistance of the Government of Norway, IMO developed model courses in response to these generally identified needs and now keeps them updated through a regular revision process taking into account any amendments to the requirements prescribed in IMO instruments and any technological developments in the field.

These model courses may be used by any training institution and, when the requisite financing is available, the Organization is prepared to assist developing countries in implementing any course.

E. E. MITROPOULOS
Secretary-General
Introduction

Purpose of the model courses

The purpose of the IMO model courses is to assist maritime training institutes and their teaching staff in organizing and introducing new training courses, or in enhancing, updating or supplementing existing training material where the quality and effectiveness of the training courses may thereby be improved.

It is not the intention of the model course program to present instructors with a rigid “teaching package” which they are expected to “follow blindly”. Nor is it the intention to substitute audio-visual or “programmed” material for the instructor’s presence. As in all training endeavors, the knowledge, skills and dedication of the instructor are the key components in the transfer of knowledge and skills to those being trained through IMO model course material.

Because educational systems and the cultural backgrounds of trainees in maritime subjects vary considerably from country to country, the model course material has been designed to identify the basic entry requirements and trainee target group for each course in universally applicable terms, and to specify clearly the technical content and levels of knowledge and skill necessary to meet the intent of IMO conventions and related recommendations.

Use of the model course

To use the model course the instructor should review the course plan and detailed syllabus, taking into account the information provided under the entry standards specified in the course framework. The actual level of knowledge and skills and the prior technical education of the trainees should be kept in mind during this review, and any areas within the detailed syllabus which may cause difficulties because of differences between the actual trainee entry level and that assumed by the course designer should be identified. To compensate for such differences, the instructor is expected to delete from the course, or reduce the emphasis on, items dealing with knowledge or skills already attained by the trainees. He should also identify any academic knowledge, skills or technical training which they may not have acquired.

By analyzing the detailed syllabus and the academic knowledge required to allow training in the technical area to proceed, the instructor can design an appropriate pre-entry course or, alternatively, insert the elements of academic knowledge required to support the technical training elements concerned at appropriate points within the technical course.

Adjustment of the course objectives, scope and content may also be necessary if in your maritime industry the trainees completing the course are to undertake duties which differ from the course objectives specified in the model course.

Within the course plan the course designers have indicated their assessment of the time that should be allotted to each learning area. However, it must be appreciated that these allocations are arbitrary and assume that the trainees have fully met all entry requirements of the course. The instructor should therefore review these assessments and may need to re-allocate the time required to achieve each specific learning objective or training outcome.
Lesson plans

Having adjusted the course content to suit the trainee intake and any revision of the course objectives, the instructor should draw up lesson plans based on the detailed syllabus. The detailed syllabus contains specific references to the textbooks or teaching material proposed for use in the course. Where no adjustment has been found necessary in the learning objectives of the detailed syllabus, the lesson plans may simply consist of the detailed syllabus with keywords or other reminders added to assist the instructor in making his presentation of the material.

Presentation

The presentation of concepts and methodologies must be repeated in various ways until the instructor is satisfied that the trainee has attained each specific learning objective. The syllabus is laid out in learning-objective format and each objective specifies what the trainee must be able to do as the learning outcome.

Implementation

For the course to run smoothly and to be effective, considerable attention must be paid to the availability and use of:

- properly qualified instructors;
- support staff;
- rooms and other spaces;
- equipment;
- textbooks, technical papers; and
- other reference material.

Thorough preparation is the key to successful implementation of the course. IMO has produced “Guidance on the Implementation of IMO Model Courses,” which deals with this aspect in greater detail and is included as an attachment to this course.
Part A: Course Framework

■ Aims

This model course aims to provide guidance to seafarers on precautions to be taken to reduce the risks of piracy attacks and the possible response to a piracy threat.

■ Objective

Those who successfully complete this course will have sufficient knowledge and skills to:

1. understand piracy threats and current patterns;
2. carry out risk assessment;
3. prepare for transiting high risk area;
4. conduct transit of high risk areas; while monitoring the threat situation and
5. take effective action on encountering pirate crafts.

■ Entry standards

This course is open to all seafarers. There are no particular educational requirements.

■ Course certificate, diploma or document

Documentary evidence should be issued to those who have successfully completed this course indicating that the holder has completed training, as per this model course, on “Actions to be taken to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery”.

■ Course delivery

The outcome of this course may be achieved through various methods, but not limited to classroom training, in-service training, distance learning, computer-based training or combinations of these methods.

■ Course intake limitations

The maximum number of trainees would depend on the facilities and equipment available, bearing in mind the aims and objectives of this course, but preferably limited to 20.

■ Staff requirements

The instructor in charge of the course should have completed a Company Security Officer or Ship Security Officer course, or alternatively, have adequate experience in maritime security matters.

It is recommended that instructors should either have appropriate training in or be familiar with instructional techniques and training methods.
Teaching facilities and equipment

An ordinary classroom or similar meeting room with a blackboard or equivalent is sufficient for the lectures. In addition, when making use of audiovisual materials, it should be ensured that appropriate equipment is available. Finally, the use of shipboard environment (vessels or mock-ups) for certain segments of the course may enhance the overall effectiveness of this training.

Teaching aids (A)

A1 Instructor Manual (Part D of the course)
A2 Audiovisual aids: video compact disc player, TV, LCD projector, overhead projector, etc.
A3 Photographs, models, or other representations of various type of vessels and vessel parts to illustrate operational elements and security vulnerabilities.
A4 Video cassette(s): None recommended at this time.
A5 Distance learning package(s): None recommended at this time.
A6 Computer Based Training (CBT)

- CBT # 156 – Piracy and Armed Robbery – by Seagull
  Available from: Seagull AS
  Gamleveien 36, P.O. Box 1062
  N-3194 Horten, Norway
  Tel: +47 33 03 09 10

- Piracy and Armed Robbery – by Videotel
  Available from: Videotel Marine International Ltd.
  84 Newman Street
  London W1P 3LD, UK
  Tel: +44 171 299 1800
  Fax: +44 171 299 1818
  e-mail: mail@videotelmail.com
  URL: www.videotel.co.uk

- Best Management Practices to Avoid, Deter or Delay Acts of Piracy – by The Liberian Registry.

Bibliography (B)

B1 OCIMF, Piracy – The East Africa/Somalia Situation, Practical Measures to Avoid, Deter or Delay Piracy Attacks, 2009
B2 Website of “International Maritime Organization” – www.imo.org
B3 Website of “Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” – www.recaap.org
B4 Website of “IMB Piracy Reporting Center” – www.icc-ccs.org
B5 Website of “Maritime Security Center (Horn of Africa)” – www.mschoa.org
PART A: COURSE FRAMEWORK

B7 Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, Peter Lehr, Lloyds Marine Intelligence Unit.
B8 Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, Martin N – Murphy, Adelphi Paper.

■ IMO references (R)

R1 MSC.1/Circ.1334, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Guidance to ship-owners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, Annex
R2 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1335, 29 September 2009, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia, Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia developed by the industry, Annex 2
R3 MSC.1/Circ.1333, 26 June 2009, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships

■ Textbooks (T)

None recommended at this time.
Part B: Course Outline and Timetable

Part B (1): Course Outline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Area</th>
<th>Hours</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Introduction</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Course overview *</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2. Current piracy threats and patterns *</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3. IMO and other organizations and their role *</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4. Limitations of Protection Forces *</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Preparations prior transit through high risk areas</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1. Information gathering. Risk assessment through available information</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2. Passage planning and reporting including planning for convoys/group transit</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3. Planning defensive measures *</td>
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<td>2.3.1. General protection measures</td>
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<td>2.3.2. Emergency drills and briefings</td>
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<td>2.3.3. Lethal/non-lethal/passive defensive devices</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3.4. Armed/unarmed security personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3. Threat recognition and response</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1. In transit operations *</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2. Suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected *</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3. Being certain that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted *</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4. Pirate/armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.5. Pirates/armed robbers start to board ship *</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.6. Pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship *</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.7. Pirates/armed robbers gain control of ship/one or more of the crew *</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.8. Surviving as a hostage *</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.9. Pirates/armed robbers disembark from ship *</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.10. In the event of military action *</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. Surviving as a hostage</strong></td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5. Post incident</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.1. Debrief and incident reporting after attack</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**SUB-TOTAL** 5.75 0.25

**TOTAL** 6 HRS

* For training programmes limited to support level staff, the course outline may be limited to the items marked with *** and the duration for the subject area may be condensed to suit the target audience.
## Part B (2): Course Timetable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Area</th>
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<td><strong>Day/Session: Morning</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Introduction</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Course overview</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2. Current piracy threats and patterns</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3. IMO and other organizations and their role</td>
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<td>1.4. Limitations of Protection Forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Preparations prior transit through high risk areas</strong></td>
<td>1.75 0.25</td>
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<td>2.1. Information gathering. Risk assessment through available information.</td>
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<td>2.2. Passage planning and reporting including planning for convoys/group transit</td>
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<td>2.3.3. Lethal/non-lethal/passive defensive devices</td>
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<td>2.3.4. Armed/unarmed security personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Day/Session: Afternoon</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3. Threat recognition and response</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1. In transit operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2. Suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. Surviving as a hostage</strong></td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5. Post incident</strong></td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.1. Debrief and incident reporting after attack</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SUB-TOTAL</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 HRS</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Part C: Detailed Teaching Syllabus

The detailed teaching syllabus indicates the contents of the course and appropriate references and teaching aids.

Learning objectives

The detailed teaching syllabus has been written in learning objective format in which the objective describes what the trainee must do to demonstrate that knowledge has been transferred. This format is an appropriate teaching and assessment tool to express:

- the depth of understanding of a subject and the degree of familiarization with a subject on the part of the trainee,
- what capabilities the trainee should really have and be able to demonstrate.

Every instructor is encouraged to teach learning in an ‘objective-related’ way instead ‘material-related’. In this context, all objectives are understood to be prefixed by the words, ‘The expected learning outcome is that the trainee is able to...’.

To indicate the degree of learning outcome of this course, the learning objectives for the Detailed Teaching Syllabus can be classified in three ‘dimensions’:

C (cognitive)
A (affective)
P (psycho-motor)

Within a dimension, they are hierarchised by increasing complexity (C1 to C6, A1 to A5, and P1 to P5) where the complexity (depth, familiarization) is expressed (following B. Bloom and others) by a typical verb as follows:

Cognitive dimension of learning objectives:
C1 Knowledge describe, outline
C2 Comprehension explain
C3 Application apply, perform, operate
C4 Analysis analyse
C5 Synthesis synthesise, construct, plan
C6 Evaluation assess

Affective dimension of learning objectives:
A1 Reception; notice recognise
A2 Response respond
A3 Value value
A4 Organization organise
A5 Value characterisation accept, appreciate

Psycho-motor dimension of learning objectives:
P1 Imitation imitate
P2 Manipulation manipulate
P3 Precision move, mark
P4 Co-ordination co-ordinate (operations, menus)
P5 Naturalisation automate, internalise
References and teaching aids

In order to assist the instructor, references are shown against the learning objective to indicate IMO references and publications, bibliographies, textbooks and other references, as well as additional teaching aids which the instructor may wish to use when preparing course material. The material is listed in the course framework. The following notations and abbreviations are used:

- **R**: IMO reference
- **T**: Textbook and other references
- **B**: Bibliography
- **A**: Teaching aid
- **App.**: Appendix
- **An.**: Annex
- **Add.**: Addendum
- **ch.**: Chapter
- **p.**: Page
- **pa.**: Paragraph
- **reg.**: Regulation
- **sect.**: Section

The following are examples of the use of references:

- “R1 pa 1 reg.1” refers to paragraph 1 of the Annex to MSC.1/Circ.1334, Piracy and armed robbery against ships, Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

- “Al sect. 2.3” refers to section 2.3, planning defensive measures in the guidance notes of the instructor manual.

Note

Throughout the course, safe working practices are to be clearly defined and emphasized with reference to current international requirements and regulations. It is expected that the institution implementing the course will insert references to national and/or regional requirements and regulations as necessary.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learning Objectives</th>
<th>IMO Reference</th>
<th>Textbooks, Bibliography</th>
<th>Teaching Aid</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1. Introduction 1 h</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1. Course overview</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1.1. describe the topics and the emphasis of the course</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A1 sect 1.1</td>
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<td>1.2. Current piracy threats and patterns</td>
<td>R1 p1</td>
<td>B2, B6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2.1. explain the difference between theft and piracy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A1 sect 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2. describe typical attacks and lessons learnt</td>
<td>R2 p2</td>
<td>B2, B3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2.3. assess the summary and analysis made using incident statistics on piracy and hijacking</td>
<td>R2 p2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3. IMO, IMB and other organizations and their role</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3.1. recognize the role of IMO, IMB and Recap in protecting the integrity of international trade.</td>
<td>B2, B3, B4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2. recognize the role of MSCHOA and other such organizations</td>
<td>B5</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4. Limitations of protection forces.</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td></td>
<td>A1 sect 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1. appreciate the laws under which the warships operate. Example – Malacca Straits, Gulf of Aden</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.2. appreciate the legal limitations of the authorities in providing assistance.</td>
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## Learning Objectives

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Part D: Instructor Manual

The instructor manual provides guidance on the material that is to be presented during the course. This manual reflects the views of the course developers with respect to methodology and organization as well as what they consider relevant and important in light of their experience as instructors. Although the guidance given should be of value initially, each instructor should develop his/her own methods and ideas, recognize and refine what is successful, and discard that which does not work satisfactorily.

The material has been arranged under the following five main headings:

1. Introduction
2. Preparations prior transit through high risk areas
3. Threat recognition and response
4. Surviving as a hostage
5. Post incident.

The course outline provides guidance on the time allocation for the course material, but the instructor is free to modify this if it is deemed necessary. Based on the level of experience of the participants, when planning the training programme, the instructor should vary the process of delivery, increasing/decreasing the emphasis in all sections as appropriate. Where the training program is targeted only at support level staff, sections 2.1, 2.2 and 5 may be omitted and the remaining sections may be condensed as appropriate.

The detailed teaching syllabus must be studied carefully and, where appropriate, lesson plans or lecture notes compiled.

Preparation and planning are the most important criteria in effectively presenting this course. Availability and proper use of course materials is also essential for maximum efficacy in conveying the subject to trainees. The capabilities and limitations of the facilities in use may dictate that the learning objectives be adjusted but it is suggested that this be kept to a minimum.

Where possible, lectures should be supported by written course materials, videos, and other media that allow the trainee to embrace the material more fully. It will be necessary to prepare material for use with overhead projectors or for distribution to trainees as handouts.
Guidance Notes

1. Introduction

1.1. Course overview

As with other IMO Model Courses the starting point should be a brief statement of the purpose of the course, a short review of the timeline, an introduction of participants, determination of knowledge and experience levels, and a brief description of the teaching facility.

Instructors should emphasize that no one is being trained to fight pirates, but rather that trainees should be able to identify, deter, or mitigate such actions through proper planning, preparation, and coordination with various entities.

1.2. Current piracy threats and patterns

Piracy and armed attacks have existed for as long as the oceans were plied for commerce. The recent surge, particularly in the waters between the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, off the Somali coast, and also in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore, has made it a very significant issue.

Trainees are most likely to appreciate the seriousness and the extent of the problem of piracy if they have a sense of the relevant history. Notable examples of piracy incidents should be shown here. To fully grasp the importance of the training provided by this course, current threats should be shown in the form of statistics as well as pictorially, showing the areas of attacks as well as emphasizing on the increase in the past few years. Those receiving this training must clearly sense the reality of today’s piracy issues. Some may have adopted a mindset that places the problem of piracy in the past or in such a remote corner that it appears distant or irrelevant. Before continuing on with the course this mindset should be identified and addressed.

The Instructors should then show some typical attack profiles from the data accumulated which indicate the vulnerabilities exploited by the pirates, which are:

(a) Low speed
(b) Low freeboard
(c) Inadequate planning and procedures
(d) Visible low state of alertness and/or lack of evident precautionary measures on ships
(e) Where a slow response by the ship is evident.

1.3. IMO, IMB and other organizations and their role in preventing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships

Trainees should appreciate the attempts by international bodies to minimize, stop, or otherwise control acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.
The instructor should describe the role played by International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), and other intergovernmental organizations in assisting in anti-piracy measures.

The instructor should also advise roles of the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa) (MSCHOA), the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), and other such organizations in combating piracy.

1.4. Limitation of protection forces

The trainees must understand the limitations faced by governments and other protection agencies such as:

(a) Legal barriers to prosecuting individuals captured in international waters. Countries are struggling to apply existing maritime law, international law, and their own laws, which limit them to having jurisdiction over their own citizens. According to piracy experts, the goal is to “deter and disrupt” pirate activity and pirates are often detained, interrogated, disarmed, and released. With millions of dollars at stake, pirates have little incentive to stop.

(b) Prosecutions are rare for several reasons. Modern laws against piracy are almost non-existent. Warships that capture pirates have no jurisdiction to try them. Prosecutors have a hard time assembling witnesses and finding translators, and countries are reluctant to imprison pirates because they would be saddled with them upon their release.

(c) Other limitation of protection forces:

(i) consent to foreign naval vessels and military aircraft entering the country’s territorial sea to assist merchant ships under attack by pirates and armed robbers (consented by Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in 2008)

(ii) “Innocent unless proven Guilty”. Protection Forces cannot take any physical action against suspected craft unless the pirate crafts show signs of aggression.

2. Preparations for prior transit through high risk areas

The focus of this section is to explain that vessels can significantly improve the chances of avoiding or delaying an act of piracy by taking a number of relatively simple preparatory steps.

2.1. Information gathering, risk assessment through available information

It would be helpful for the trainees to understand the role of the Company Security Officer in assimilating the information and trends of piracy attacks as well as information on Group convoys/escorts which is passed to the ship. The various sources used by the Company Security Officer could be identified. In addition, the ship also receives navigational warnings with Piracy Information.
In addition to gathering the above information, the trainees should also be able to understand the importance of assessing the ship’s physical characteristics such as freeboard, speed etc when evaluating the risk.

2.2. Passage planning and reporting, including planning for convoys/group transit

The instructor should explain, how based on the information gathered, the Master identifies the options available for his passage such as choosing the route, delaying passage to make transit in high risk areas during day/night (as recommended), lifting anchor and drifting, using of group convoys/escorts, registration of transit/convoy etc and plan his passage accordingly.

Additionally, he must state the importance of identifying the reporting requirements for the routes chosen as well as of preparing “emergency communications” to be sent out in case of attack.

MSCHOA as well as various administrations routeing guidelines and reporting could be shown as examples. Also, examples of application and use of escort vessel provided by various countries could be shown.

2.3. Planning defensive measures

The trainee must understand that the most important defensive measure would be to reduce the temptation for piracy. If the ship appears vigilant and ready, the chances of an attack is considerable reduced.

2.3.1 General protection measures

Early detection of a possible attack may often be the most effective deterrent. The Instructor should highlight the general preparations for transit in high risk areas. This should include enhanced surveillance by identification of blind spots; planning of additional lookouts and ensuring crew are adequately rested. Usage and availability of lighting, night vision binoculars and dummies as well as other surveillance and detection equipment should be explained.

The instructor must explain the importance of hardening the ship by securing, in accordance with the ship security plan, all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine-room, steering gear compartments, officers’ cabins and crew accommodation. The use of surveillance equipment as well as regular patrolling to monitor these areas should also be discussed. The instructor should explain that the intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will find difficult to penetrate. Securing by locking or other means of controlling access to unattended spaces adjoining areas could also prove useful.

Securing doors providing access to, and egress from, secure or key areas may give rise to concern over safety in the event of an accident. In any situation where there is a conflict between safety and security, it should be emphasized that the safety requirements should be paramount. Nevertheless, attempts should be made to incorporate appropriate safety provisions while allowing accesses and exits to be secured or controlled.

The pros and cons of switching of the AIS, including SOLAS requirements, should be discussed stating the recommendations given by Best Management Practices issued by
industry bodies. However, it must be emphasized that in the event of an attack, it should be ensured that the AIS, if switched off, is turned on again and transmitting to enable security forces to locate the vessel.

2.3.2 Emergency drills and briefings

Ship security plans or emergency response procedures should ensure that masters and crews are made fully aware of the risks involved during attacks by pirates or armed robbers. In particular, they should address the dangers that may arise if a crew adopts an aggressive response to an attack. Aggressive responses, once an attack is underway and, in particular, once the attackers have boarded the ship, could significantly increase the risk to the ship and those on board.

It is important that any response to an incident is well planned and executed, and those involved should be as familiar as possible with a ship environment. The instructor should emphasize the importance of carrying out a drill prior to transit where the plan is reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties, including familiarity with the alarm signal signifying a piracy attack.

The concept of having a “citadel” can also be explained. A secure area or “citadel” can be designated and lock-down procedures rehearsed in order to delay access to control of the ship and buy time. Ideally this should be away from external bulkheads and portholes. Those whose duties necessarily involve working outside secure areas should have practised using alternative routes to return to a secure area and places of temporary refuge should be identified in advance for those who may not be able to return to a secure area during an attack.

2.3.3 Lethal/non-lethal/passive defensive devices

The instructor should emphasize IMOs and other bodies position on Non Arming of Seafarers.

The instructor should explain how passive and non-lethal measures such as netting, barbed/razor wire, electric fencing, long-range acoustic devices etc., can be used as preventive measures to deter attackers and delay boarding. Even a simple act such as application of grease on the railings can delay the boarding. The use of water hoses to deter boarding should also be discussed.

Safety Precautions related to the use of these devices must be explained to the trainees.

If possible, the instructor should show also these defensive devices (such as Barbed and Razor wire, etc) and demonstrate its use.

2.3.4 Armed/unarmed security personnel

In this section the instructor advises on availability of Armed and Unarmed security personnel. However, it should be emphasized that use of privately contracted armed security personnel is a matter which may require approval from the flag state and all legal requirements of flag, port and coastal States should be met.
There may also be times when military teams or law enforcement officers duly authorized by the Government of the flag State carry firearms for the security of ships. In this case, boarding conditions should be defined by the States involved, including the flag State.

The trainees should be made aware that if armed security personnel are allowed on board, in case of an attack, there is a possibility of escalation of violence and other risks.

3. Threat recognition and response

This portion of the course is concerned with In Transit Operations and Incident Response. The instructor would here describe monitoring stage as well as the various stages that would be involved in a piracy attack and discuss the appropriate actions to be taken. The trainees should appreciate how robust actions from the ship which is approached by pirates may discourage the attackers.

The instructor should start this section by highlighting the items to be monitored whilst transiting the high risk area. These would include ensuring that pre arrival notifications have been sent, ensuring adequate security measures deployed and monitored, voyage plan is being followed, etc. The importance of making an early assessment of a threat should be emphasized so that as soon as it is noted that a threat is developing, it can be reported to the authorities.

The trainee should then be explained the action to be taken during various stages of the attack such as:

- Action to take when suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected
- Action to take when it is certain that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted
- Action to take when pirate/armed robbery vessel is in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship
- Action to take when pirates/armed robbers start to board ship
- Action to take when pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship
- Action to take when the pirates/armed robbers gain control of ship/one or more of the crew
- Surviving as a hostage
- Action to take when pirates/armed robbers disembark from the ship
- Action to take in the event of military action

Early detection of suspected attacks must be the first line of defence. The trainee should be reminded that the Master should not be limited by the guidance provided by various bodies and has the authority to take any action deemed necessary to protect the lives of passengers and crew.
When attackers are on board, the trainees should be advised that the actions of the master and crew should be aimed at:

.1 securing the greatest level of safety for those on board the ship;
.2 seeking to ensure that the crew remain in control of the navigation of the ship; and
.3 securing the earliest possible departure of the attackers from the ship.

Finally, the importance of a pre-arranged signal on the ship’s siren or general alarm to alert the crew on “all clear” should be emphasized to the trainee.

4. Surviving as a hostage

This section should focus on preparing the trainees for the unfortunate event if they are taken as hostage. Every hostage or kidnap situation is different. There are no strict rules of behaviour; however, the basic DOs and DONTs can be explained.

5. Post incident

As after any other incident, the importance of carrying out a debriefing must be explained. The focus in this case will be on learning from the attack and identify areas of improvement. Those carrying out the debriefing should be aware that the seafarer may suffer from trauma or similar condition after being victimized under an attack from pirates or armed robbers. An important first step in reducing the risk from trauma is for masters to debrief crew immediately after the attack or release of a vessel in order to get crew to confront their experiences. An important second step is for counselling professionals to debrief crew as soon as possible after the attack or release of the vessel in order to assist the crew to manage their experiences.

Trainees will also appreciate that all security incidents must be reported in accordance with specific reporting requirements. It may be helpful to for instructors to provide several sample security incidents and have the class or individuals explain how they would go about reporting these incidents.
Part E: Evaluation

■ Introduction

The effectiveness of any evaluation depends on the accuracy of the description of what is to be measured.

The learning objectives that are used in the detailed teaching syllabus will provide a sound base for the construction of suitable tests for evaluating trainee progress.

■ Method of evaluation

The methods chosen to carry out an evaluation will depend upon what the trainee is expected to achieve in terms of knowing, comprehending and applying the course content.

The methods used can range from a simple question and answer discussion with the trainees (either individually or as a group) to prepared tests requiring the selection of correct or best responses from given alternatives, the correct matching of given items, the supply of short answers or the supply of more extensive written responses to prepared questions.

Where the course content is aimed at the acquisition of practical skills, the test would involve a practical demonstration by the trainee making use of appropriate equipment, tools, etc.

The responses demanded may therefore consist of:

- the recall of facts or information, by viva voce or objective tests
- the practical demonstration of an attained skill
- the oral or written description of procedures or activities
- the identification and use of data from sketches, drawings, maps, charts, etc.
- carrying out calculations to solve numerical problems
- the writing of an essay or report.

■ Validity

The evaluation must be based on clearly defined objectives, and it must truly represent what is to be measured. There must be a reasonable balance between the subject topics involved and also in the testing of trainees' KNOWLEDGE, COMPREHENSION and APPLICATION of concepts.

The time allocated for the trainee to provide a response is very important. Each question or task must be properly tested and validated before it is used to ensure that the test will provide a fair and valid evaluation.
■ Reliability

To be reliable, an evaluation procedure should produce reasonably consistent results no matter which set of papers or version of the test is used.

■ Subjective testing

Traditional methods of evaluation require the trainee to demonstrate what has been learned by stating or writing formal answers to questions.

Such evaluation is subjective in that it invariably depends upon the judgement of the evaluator. Different evaluators can produce quite different scores when marking the same paper or evaluating oral answers.

■ Objective testing

A variety of objective tests have been developed over the years. Their common feature is that the evaluation does not require a judgement by the evaluator. The response is either right or wrong.

One type of objective test involves supplying an answer, generally a single word, to complete the missing portion of a sentence. Another involves supplying a short answer of two or three words to a question. Such tests are known as ‘completion tests’ and ‘short answer tests’.

Another form of objective testing consists of ‘selective response tests’ in which the correct, or best, response must be selected from given alternatives. Such tests may consist of ‘matching tests’, in which items contained in two separate lists must be matched, or they may be of the true/false type or of the multiple-choice type.

The most flexible form of objective test is the multiple-choice test, which presents the trainee with a problem and a list of alternative solutions, from which he must select the most appropriate.

■ Distracters

The incorrect alternatives in multiple-choice questions are called ‘distracters’, because their purpose is to distract the uninformed trainee from the correct response. The distracter must be realistic and should be based on misconceptions commonly held, or on mistakes commonly made.

The options “none of the above” or “all of the above” are used in some tests. These can be helpful, but should be used sparingly.

Distracters should distract the uninformed, but they should not take the form of ‘trick’ questions that could mislead the knowledgeable trainee (for example, do not insert “not” into a correct response to make it a distracter).
PART E: EVALUATION

### Guess factor

The ‘guess factor’ with four alternative responses in a multiple-choice test would be 25%. The pass mark chosen for all selective response questions should take this into account.

### Scoring

In simple scoring of objective tests one mark may be allotted to each correct response and zero for a wrong or nil response.

A more sophisticated scoring technique entails awarding one mark for a correct response, zero for a nil response and minus one for an incorrect response. Where a multiple-choice test involves four alternatives, this means that a totally uninformed guess involves a 25% chance of gaining one mark and a 75% chance of losing one mark.

Scores can be weighted to reflect the relative importance of questions, or of sections of an evaluation.
Annex I

MSC.1/Circ.1334
Piracy and armed robbery against ships –
Guidance to shipowners and ship operators,
shipmasters and crews on preventing and
suppressing acts of piracy and
armed robbery against ships
MSC.1/Circ.1334 of 23 June 2009

1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eighty-sixth session (27 May to 5 June 2009), approved a revised MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 (Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews for preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships) as given at annex.

2 The revision was carried out on the basis of the outcome of the comprehensive review of the guidance provided by the Organization for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships; and took into account the work of the correspondence group on the review and updating of MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1, MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 and resolution A.922(22), established by MSC 84.

3 Member Governments and organizations in consultative status with IMO are recommended to bring this circular to the attention of shipowners, ship operators, shipping companies, shipmasters and crews and all other parties concerned.

4 This circular revokes MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3.
ANNEX

GUIDANCE TO SHIPOWNERS, COMPANIES¹, SHIP OPERATORS, SHIPMASTERS AND CREWS ON PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING ACTS OF PIRACY² AND ARMED ROBBERY³ AGAINST SHIPS

Introduction

1 This circular aims at bringing to the attention of shipowners, companies, ship operators, masters and crews the precautions to be taken to reduce the risks of piracy on the high seas and armed robbery against ships at anchor, off ports or when underway through a coastal State’s territorial waters. It outlines steps that should be taken to reduce the risk of such attacks, possible responses to them and the vital need to report attacks, both successful and unsuccessful, to the authorities of the relevant coastal State and to the ships’ own maritime Administration. Such reports are to be made as soon as possible, to enable necessary action to be taken.

2 It is important to bear in mind that shipowners, companies, ship operators, masters and crews can and should take measures to protect themselves and their ships from pirates and armed robbers. While security forces can often advise on these measures, and flag States are required to take such measures as are necessary to ensure that owners and masters accept their responsibility, ultimately it is the responsibility of shipowners, companies, ship operators, masters and ship operators to take seamanlike precautions when their ships navigate in areas where the threat of piracy and armed robbery exists. Planning should give consideration to the crew’s welfare during and after a period of captivity by pirates or armed robbers. Before operating in waters where attacks have been known to occur, it is imperative for shipowners, companies, ship operator and masters concerned to gather accurate information on the situation in the area. To this end the information on attacks and attempted attacks gathered, analysed and distributed by the IMO, IMB’s Piracy Reporting Center should be consulted. The latest reports provide valuable information on the location, circumstances and sequence of events of piracy and armed robbery attacks.

1 The term “company” is defined in SOLAS regulations IX/1 and XI-2/1.
2 The following definition of piracy is contained in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (article 101):
   “Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
   (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
      (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
      (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
   (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
   (c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).”
3 The Subregional meeting on piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea area, held in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, from 14 to 18 April 2008, agreed to modify this definition. Consistent with the ReCAAP Agreement, the “private ends” motive has been added to the definition. The new formulation “within internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea” replaced “within a State’s jurisdiction”. The new formulation reflects the views of France, supported by other States participating in the meeting, that the definition for armed robbery against ships should not be applicable to acts committed seaward of the territorial sea. The new definition reads: “Armed robbery against ships” means any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.
Centre and the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC)\(^1\), the Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa, Governments and others is vital information, upon which precautionary measures should be based.

3 These recommendations have been culled from a number of sources. Where conflicting advice has been apparent, the reason for choosing the recommended course has been stated.

**The pirates'/robbers' objective**

4 In addition to the hijacking of ships and the holding of the crew hostage, and the theft of cargo, other targets of the attackers include cash in the ship’s safe, crew possessions and any portable ship’s equipment. When there has been evidence of tampering with containers, it may be an indication that the raiders may initially have gained access when the ship was berthed in port and then gone over the side, with what they could carry. The application of the ISPS Code is an important precautionary measure and a thorough checking of ships’ compartments and securing them before leaving ports is therefore strongly encouraged.

**Reducing the temptation for piracy and armed robbery**

**Cash in the ship’s safe**

5 The belief that large sums of cash are carried in the master’s safe attracts attackers. In some cases this belief has been justified and sums have been stolen. While carrying cash may sometimes be necessary to meet operational needs and crew requirements and to overcome exchange control restrictions in some States, it acts as a magnet for attackers and they will intimidate and take hostage the master or crew members until the locations have been revealed. Shipowners should consider ways of eliminating the need to carry large sums of cash on board a ship. When this need arises because of exchange control restrictions imposed by States, the matter should be referred to the ship’s maritime Administration to consider if representations should be made to encourage a more flexible approach as part of the international response to eliminate attacks by pirates and armed robbers.

**Discretion by masters and members of the crew**

6 Masters should bear in mind the possibility that attackers are monitoring ship-to-shore communications and using intercepted information to select their targets. Masters should however also be aware that switching off AIS in high-risk areas reduces ability of the supporting naval vessels to track and trace vessels which may require assistance. Caution should also be exercised when transmitting information on cargo or valuables on board by radio in areas where attacks occur.

7 It is up to the master’s professional judgement to decide whether the AIS system should be switched off, in order for the ship not to be detected, when entering areas where piracy is an imminent threat, however the master should balance the risk of attack against the need to

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\(^1\) The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is a Government-to-Government Agreement that addresses the incidence of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. The status of ReCAAP ISC is an IGO. Further details may be found at [www.recaap.org](http://www.recaap.org).
maintain the safety of navigation and, in particular, the requirements of COLREG Rule 7 on Risk of collision, and should act in accordance with the guidance in resolutions A.917(22) and A.956(23). The master should also be aware that other ships operating in high-risk areas may have taken a decision to switch off the AIS system. In the event of an attack, masters should ensure to the extent feasible that AIS is turned on again and transmitting to enable security forces to locate the vessel.

8 Members of the crew going ashore in ports in affected areas should be advised not to discuss the voyage or cargo particulars with persons unconnected with the ship’s business.

Smaller crews

9 The smaller crew numbers now found on board ships also favour the attacker. A small crew engaged in ensuring the safe navigation of their ship through congested or confined waters will have the additional onerous task of maintaining high levels of security surveillance for prolonged periods. Shipowners may wish to consider enhancing security watches if their ship is in waters or at anchor off ports, where attacks occur. Shipowners may wish to consider providing appropriate surveillance and detection equipment to aid their crews and protect their ships.

Recommended practices

10 The recommended practices outlined below are based on reports of incidents, advice published by commercial organizations and measures developed to enhance ship security. The extent to which the recommendations are followed or applied are matters solely for the owners or masters of ships operating in areas where attacks occur. The shipping industry would also benefit from consulting other existing recommendations, including those given by the ReCAAP ISC\(^1\), the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, BIMCO, ICS and other industry bodies.

11 Given that the masters are often required to follow multiple reporting procedures in these difficult circumstances, it is necessary to simplify these procedures as far as operationally feasible. It is therefore recommended that in the event of an occurrence masters should report all actual or attempted attacks of piracy and armed robbery or threats thereof, to:

(i) the nearest RCC or regional piracy focal point where applicable (e.g., ReCAAP ISC in the Asian region\(^2\)),

(ii) the flag State, and

(iii) the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre\(^3\).

12 The recommended actions are defined as phases related to any voyage in a piracy and armed robbery threat area. The phases define the main stages in all situations of pre-piracy or armed robbery, attempted piracy or armed robbery and confirmed piracy or armed robbery.

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\(^1\) The ReCAAP ISC collates and analyses information concerning piracy and armed robbery against ships, and publishes regular reports which identify patterns and trends, highlight good practices and recommend preventive measures.

\(^2\) See Appendices 1 and 2 to this circular regarding the information-sharing and incident-reporting processes generally and in the Asian region.

\(^3\) The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre is manned 24 hours a day and set up to receive and promulgate reports of attacks or attempted attacks worldwide.
Depending on the development of any one situation, they may or may not materialize. A list of phases is given in Appendix 3.

The pre-piracy/armed robbery phase

13 Written procedures on how to prevent or suppress attacks of pirates and armed robbers should be found either in the ship’s Safety Management System or in the ship security plan.

14 The entry into force of the ISPS Code and the ISM Code have made security assessments and risk assessments an integral part of the safety and security precautions. Measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships should be part of either the emergency response procedures in the safety management system, or as a situation that requires increased alertness, should become a part of the procedures in the ship security plan.

15 All ships operating in waters or ports where attacks occur should carry out a security assessment as a preparation for development of measures to prevent attacks of pirates or armed robbers against ships and on how to react should an attack occur. This should be included as a part of the emergency response procedures in the safety management system or a part of the procedures in the ship security plan. The security assessment should take into account the basic parameters of the operation including:

.1 the risks that may be faced including any information given on characteristics of piracy or armed robbery in the specific area;
.2 the ship’s actual size, freeboard, maximum speed, and the type of cargo;
.3 the number of crew members available, their proficiency and training;
.4 the ability to establish secure areas on board ship; and
.5 the equipment on board, including any surveillance and detection equipment that has been provided.

16 The ship security plan or emergency response procedures should be prepared based on the risk assessment, detailing predetermined responses to address increases and decreases in threat levels.

The measures should, inter alia, cover:

.1 the need for enhanced surveillance and the use of lighting, surveillance and detection equipment;
.2 controlling of access to the ship and the restricted areas on the ships by ships’ personnel, passengers, visitors, etc.;
.3 prevention of unauthorized intrusion by active and passive devices and measures, such as netting, wire, electric fencing, long-range acoustic devices, as well as the use, when appropriate, of security personnel on vessels transiting high-risk areas, and taking other measures to make it more difficult for pirates to board vessels. The safety of onboard personnel should always be taken into account when installing passive devices on board and awareness information should be provided;

Guidance can be found in the ISPS Code.
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.4 monitoring the security of the ship;
.5 crew responses, if a potential attack is detected or an attack is underway;
.6 the radio alarm procedures to be followed; and
.7 the reports to be made after an attack or an attempted attack.

Ship security plans or emergency response procedures should ensure that masters and crews are made fully aware of the risks involved during attacks by pirates or armed robbers. In particular, they should address the dangers that may arise if a crew adopts an aggressive response to an attack. Early detection of a possible attack may often be the most effective deterrent. Aggressive responses, once an attack is underway and, in particular, once the attackers have boarded the ship, could significantly increase the risk to the ship and those on board.

17 In accordance with the ship security plan, all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine-room, steering gear compartments, officers’ cabins and crew accommodation should be secured and controlled in affected areas and should be regularly inspected. The use of surveillance equipment to monitor the areas as well as regular patrolling can be of merit. The intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will find difficult to penetrate. Securing by locking or other means of controlling access to unattended spaces adjoining areas could also prove useful.

18 The shipowner, company, operator and master should bear in mind, the seafarer’s need for shore leave and access to shore-based welfare facilities and medical care.

19 It is important that any response to an incident is well planned and executed, and those involved should be as familiar as possible with a ship environment. Therefore, those responsible within the security forces for responding to acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, whether at sea or in port, should be trained in the general layout and features of the types of ships most likely to be encountered and shipowners in consultation with the flag State should cooperate with the security forces in providing access to their ships to allow the necessary onboard familiarization.

Routeing and delaying anchoring

20 If at all possible, ships should be routed away from areas where attacks are known to have taken place and, in particular, seek to avoid bottlenecks. When deciding on a ship’s route the company should take into consideration the type of ship, the size and maximum speed as well as the freeboard and the dangerous nature of the cargo. If convoys are offered such a measure should also be considered to avoid serious attacks on ships at sea. If ships are approaching ports where attacks have taken place on ships at anchor, rather than ships underway, and it is known that the ship will have to anchor off port for some time, consideration should be given to delaying anchoring by longer routeing to remain well off shore or other methods by which the period during which the ship will be at risk is reduced. Contact with port authorities should ensure that berthing priorities are not affected. Charter party agreements should recognize that ships may need to delay arrival at ports where attacks occur either when no berth is available for the ship or offshore loading or unloading will be delayed for a protracted period.
Practise the implementation of the ship security plan

21 Prior to entering an area, where attacks have occurred, the ship’s crew should have practised the procedures set down in the ship security plan. Alarm signals and procedures should have been thoroughly practised and training and drills carried out. If instructions are to be given over the ship’s address systems or personal radios, they must be clearly understood by those who may not have fully mastered the language in which the instructions will be given.

22 In order to ensure higher vigilance upon entering the area where attacks occur, additional specific security briefings should be given to all ship personnel on the threats of piracy, re-emphasizing the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects or activities. Full or partial searches of the ship should be carried out regularly while in the area with heightened threat of attack.

23 It cannot be emphasized enough that all possible access points to the ship and any key and secure areas on it must be secured or controlled in port, at anchor and when underway in affected areas. Crews should be trained in the use of any additional surveillance or detection equipment installed on the ship. Planning and training must be on the basis that an attack will take place and not in the belief that with some luck it will not happen. Indications to attackers that the ship has an alert and trained crew implementing a ship security plan will help to deter them from attacking the ship.

Precautions at anchor or in port

24 In areas where attacks occur, the ships’ masters should exercise vigilance when their ships are preparing to anchor or while at anchor. Furthermore, it is important to limit, record and control those who are allowed access to a ship when in port or at anchor. Photographing those who board the ship can be a useful deterrent or assist the identification of attackers who may have had access to the ship prior to their attack. Given that attackers may use knowledge of cargo manifests to select their targets, every effort should be made to limit the circulation of documents which give information on the cargoes on board or their location on the ship. Similar precautions should be taken in regard to the circulation of information on crew members' personal valuables and ship’s equipment, as these items are also targeted by attackers.

25 Prior to leaving port, the ship should be thoroughly searched and all doors or access points secured or controlled. This is particularly important in the case of the bridge, engine-room, steering space and other vulnerable areas. Doors and access points should be regularly checked thereafter. The means of controlling doors or access points which would need to be used in the event of an emergency on board will need careful consideration. Ship or crew safety should not be compromised. Searches on board for intruders should be conducted in such a way that the safety of the crew performing these duties is not compromised.

26 Security guards employed in port or at anchorage on different ships should be in communication with each other and the port authorities during their watch. The responsibility for vetting such guards lies with the security personnel companies, which themselves should be vetted by the appropriate authorities.
Watchkeeping and vigilance

27 Maintaining vigilance is essential. All too often the first indication of an attack has been when the attackers appear on the bridge or in the master’s cabin. Advance warning of a possible attack will give the opportunity to sound alarms, alert other ships and the coastal authorities, illuminate the suspect craft, undertake evasive manoeuvring or initiate other response procedures. Signs that the ship is aware it is being approached can deter attackers.

28 When ships are in, or approaching areas of known risk of piracy or armed robbery, bridge watches and look-outs should be augmented, bearing in mind that many attacks are mounted from astern. Additional watches on the stern or covering radar “blind spots” should be considered. Companies should consider investing in low-light binoculars for bridge staff and look-outs. Radar should be constantly manned but it may be difficult to detect low profile fast moving craft on ship’s radars. A yacht radar mounted on the stern may provide additional radar cover capable of detecting small craft approaching from astern when the ship is underway. Use of an appropriately positioned yacht radar when the ship is at anchor may also provide warning of the close approach of small craft.

29 It is particularly important to maintain a radar and visual watch for craft which may be trailing the ship when underway but which could close in quickly when mounting an attack. Small craft which appear to be matching the speed of the ship on a parallel or following course should always be treated with suspicion. When a suspect craft has been noticed, it is important that an effective all-round watch is maintained for fear the first craft is a decoy with the intention to board the ship from a second craft while attention is focused on the first.

30 In addition to the use of overt means of transmitting alerts, the ship security alert system could be used in the event of a piracy or armed robbery attack. It should, however, be borne in mind that certain non-disclosure issues prevail with regards to the configuration and locations of the system.

31 Companies owning or operating ships that frequently visit areas where attacks occur should consider the purchase and use of more sophisticated visual and electronic devices in order to augment both radar and visual watch capability against attackers’ craft at night, thereby improving the prospects of obtaining an early warning of a possible attack. In particular, the provision of night vision devices, small radars to cover the blind stern arcs, closed circuit television and physical devices, such as barbed wire, may be considered. In certain circumstances non-lethal weapons such as acoustic devices, may also be appropriate. Infrared detection and alerting equipment may also be utilized.

Communications procedures

32 The master should ensure that an authorized person responsible for communications is on duty at all time when the ship is in, or approaching, areas where attacks occur. It should be ensured that ship-shore communication methods are tested and report intervals agreed prior to entering the high-risk area. The frequency of reporting should be maintained.
33 Shipowners should report attacks and attempted attacks to any national, regional or subregional reporting systems made available by Governments, including those run by security forces.

34 Where possible, ships raising alerts should specify that an act of “piracy/armed robbery” is in progress, in line with other distress categories such as “sinking” or “on fire”. This could have a potential to improve the alerting process and speed of response.

35 Prior to entering areas where attacks have occurred and where the GMDSS installation on board does not have facility for automatically updating the “ship position” data from an associated electronic navigation aid, it is strongly recommended to enter the ship’s position at regular intervals into the appropriate communications equipment manually. It is recommended that owners initiate the GMDSS INMARSAT “C” alarm programme before entering affected areas for use when appropriate.

36 When entering waters where piracy or armed robbery activities have been reported – especially if the AIS is turned off for security reasons – the ship should routinely transmit its position to the shipping company at given intervals, thereby giving the shipping company a first notice that something is amiss if the transmissions are interrupted. Masters should act in accordance with the guidance in resolution A.917(22) on Guidelines for the onboard operational use of shipborne automatic identification systems (AIS) and resolution A.956(23) on Amendments to the guidelines for the onboard operational use of shipborne automatic identification systems (AIS) (resolution A.917(22)) concerning the turning off of AIS. In the event of an attack, masters should ensure to the extent feasible that AIS is turned on and transmitting to enable security forces to locate the vessel.

Radio watchkeeping and responses

37 A constant radio watch should be maintained with the appropriate shore or naval authorities when in areas where attacks have occurred. Continuous watch should also be maintained on all distress and safety frequencies channels or frequencies which could have been determined by local authorities for certain areas. Ships should also ensure all maritime safety information broadcasts for the area monitored. As it is anticipated that INMARSAT’s enhanced group calling system (EGC) will normally be used for such broadcasts using the SafetyNET service, owners should ensure a suitably configured EGC receiver is continuously available when in, or approaching areas where there is risk of attack. Owners should also consider fitting a dedicated receiver for this purpose, i.e. one that is not incorporated into a Ship Earth Station used for commercial purposes to ensure no urgent broadcasts are missed.

38 IMO recommends in MSC.1/Circ.1333 that Governments should arrange for RCCs to be able to pass reports of attacks to the appropriate security forces. As for the reports from the ship, see paragraphs 11, and 39 to 44, below.

39 If suspicious movements are identified which may result in an imminent attack, the ship is advised to contact the relevant RCC, the flag State or other relevant information centres such as the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre or the ReCAAP ISC. Where the master believes these movements could constitute a direct danger to navigation, consideration should be given to broadcasting an “All stations (CQ)” “danger message” as a warning to other ships in the vicinity as well as advising the appropriate RCC. A danger message should be transmitted...
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in plain language using the “safety” priority. All such measures shall be preceded by the safety signal (Sécurité)¹.

40 When, in his/her opinion, there is conclusive evidence that the safety of the ship is threatened, the master should immediately contact the relevant RCC or, in certain areas, with the radio stations which could have been recommended by local authorities, and if considered appropriate, authorize broadcast of an “All Stations” “Urgent Message” any radiocommunications service he/she considers appropriate or which could have been recommended by local authorities, e.g., INMARSAT, etc. All such messages shall be preceded by the appropriate Urgency signal (PAN PAN) and/or a DSC call using the “all ships urgency” category. If the Urgency signal has been used and an attack does not, in fact, develop, the ship should cancel the message as soon as it knows that action is no longer necessary. This message of cancellation should likewise be addressed to “all stations”.

41 Should an attack occur and, in the opinion of the master, the ship or crew are in grave and imminent danger requiring immediate assistance, the master should immediately authorize the broadcasting of a distress message, preceded by the appropriate distress alerts (MAYDAY, DSC, etc.), using all available radiocommunications systems. To minimize delays, if using a ship earth station, ships should ensure the coast earth station associated with the RCC is used. For ships subject to the ISPS Code, a distress signal should also be sent to the flag State using the most expeditious means for example the ships security alert system. All ships should however report the attack to the flag State to help the investigation of incidents involving ships entitled to fly their flag.

42 The ship may be able to send a covert piracy alert to an RCC. However, as pirates may be on board the ship and within audible range of the communication equipment, when the RCC sends an acknowledgement of receipt and attempts to establish communication, they could be alerted to the fact that a piracy alert has been transmitted. This knowledge may serve to further endanger the lives of the crew on board the ship. RCCs and others should, therefore, be aware of the danger of unwillingly alerting the pirates that a distress alert or other communication has been transmitted by the ship.

43 Masters should bear in mind that the distress signal is provided for use only in case of imminent danger and its use for less urgent purposes might result in insufficient attention being paid to calls from ships really in need of immediate assistance. Care and discretion must be employed in its use, to prevent its devaluation in the future. Where the transmission of the Distress signal is not fully justified, use should be made of the Urgency signal. The Urgency signal has priority over all communications other than distress.

Standard ships’ message formats

44 The standard ships’ message formats given in Appendix 4 should be used for all piracy/armed robbery initial and follow-up alert reports.

¹ Specific guidance in respect of waters off the coast of Somalia has been issued as MSC.1/Circ.1332 and also MSC.1/Circ.1302.
Lighting

45 Ships should use the maximum lighting available consistent with safe navigation, having regard in particular to the provisions of Rule 20(b) of the 1972 Collision Regulations. Bow and overside lights should be left on if it can be done without endangering navigation. Ships must not keep on deck lights when underway, as it may lead other ships to assume the ship is at anchor. Wide beam floods could illuminate the area astern of the ship. Signal projector lights can be used systematically to probe for suspect craft using the radar guidance if possible. So far as is practicable crew members on duty outside the ship’s secure areas when in port or at anchor should avail themselves of shadow and avoid being silhouetted by deck lights as this may make them targets for seizure by approaching attackers.

46 Based on specific information on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in specific regions, ships may consider travelling blacked out except for mandatory navigation lights. This may prevent attackers establishing points of reference when approaching a ship. In addition, turning on the ship’s lights as attackers approach could alert them that they have been seen, dazzle them and encourage them to desist. It is difficult, however, to maintain full blackout on a merchant ship. The effectiveness of this approach will ultimately depend in part on the level of moonlight, but primarily on the vigilance of the ship’s crew. While suddenly turning on the ship’s light may alarm or dazzle attackers, it could also place the crew at a disadvantage at a crucial point through temporary loss of their night vision.

Secure areas

47 In accordance with the ship security plan, all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine-room, steering gear compartments, officers’ cabins and crew accommodation should be secured and controlled at all times and should be regularly inspected. The intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will find difficult to penetrate. Consideration should be given to the installation of special access control systems to the ship’s secure areas. Ports, scuttles and windows which could provide access to such secure areas should be securely closed and should have laminated glass, if possible. Deadlights should be shut and clipped tightly. The internal doors within secure areas which give immediate access to key areas such as the bridge, radio room, engine-room and master’s cabin should be strengthened and have special access control systems and automatic alarms.

48 Securing doors providing access to, and egress from, secure or key areas may give rise to concern over safety in the event of an accident. In any situation where there is a conflict between safety and security, the safety requirements should be paramount. Nevertheless, attempts should be made to incorporate appropriate safety provisions while allowing accesses and exits to be secured or controlled.

49 Owners may wish to consider providing closed-circuit television (CCTV) coverage and recording of the main access points to the ship’s secure areas, the corridors approaching the entrances to key areas and the bridge. The allocation of additional personnel to guarding and patrolling of restricted areas can be a useful preventive measure.

50 To prevent seizure of individual crew members by attackers – seizure and threatening a crew member is one of the more common means of attackers gaining control over a ship – all crew members not engaged on essential outside duties should remain within a secure area during the hours of darkness. Those whose duties necessarily involve working outside
such areas at night should remain in regular communication with the bridge, it may be the first indication of an attack if the watchkeeper does not report in, if manning permits work in pairs, make irregular rounds on the deck and should have practised using alternative routes to return to a secure area in the event of an attack. Crew members who fear they may not be able to return to a secure area during an attack should select places in advance in which they can take temporary refuge.

51 There should be designated muster areas within the ship’s secure areas where the crew can muster during an attack and communicate their location and numbers to the bridge.

Alarms

52 Alarm signals, including the ship’s whistle, should be sounded on the approach of attackers. Alarms and signs of response can discourage attackers. Alarm signals or announcements which provide an indication at the point at which the attacker may board, or have boarded, may help crew members in exposed locations select the most appropriate route to return to a secure area. Announcements made by the crew should be made in the working language of the ship.

53 The crew initial familiarization checklist should specifically state the various alarms used on board the vessel, the response and muster station to each of these alarms. The alarms and alarm signals should be standardized throughout the fleet and not be specific.

Use of distress flares

54 The only flares authorized for carriage on board ship are intended for use if the ship is in distress and is in need of immediate assistance. As with the unwarranted use of the distress signal on the radio (see paragraph 43 above), use of distress flares simply to alert shipping rather than to indicate that the ship is in grave and imminent danger may reduce their effect in the situations in which they are intended to be used and responded to. Radio transmissions should be used to alert shipping of the risk of attacks rather than distress flares. Distress flares should only be used when the master considers that the attackers’ actions are putting his/her ship in imminent danger.

Use of defensive measures

55 Experiences show that robust actions from the ship which is approached by pirates may discourage the attackers. Outrunning attacks may be an appropriate preventive manoeuvre. If the situation permits, the speed should be increased and maintained at the maximum level. Provided that navigational safety allows, masters should also consider “riding off” attackers’ craft by heavy wheel movements and turning into wind so as to remove any lee from either side of the ship. Heavy wheel movements should only be used when attackers are alongside and boarding is imminent. The effect of the bow wave and wash may deter would-be attackers and make it difficult for them to attach poles or grappling irons to the ship. Manoeuvres of this kind should not be used in confined or congested waters or close inshore or by ships constrained by their draught in the confined deep water routes found, for example, in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
Use of passive and non-lethal devices

56 The use of passive and non-lethal measures such as netting, wire, electric fencing, and long-range acoustic devices may be appropriate preventive measures to deter attackers and delay boarding.

57 The use of water hoses should also be considered though they may be difficult to train if evasive manoeuvring is also taking place. Water pressures of 80 lb per square inch and above have deterred and repulsed attackers. Not only does the attacker have to fight against the jet of water but the flow may swamp his/her boat and damage engines and electrical systems. Special fittings for training hoses could be considered which would also provide protection for the hose operator. A number of spare fire hoses could be rigged and tied down to be pressurized at short notice if a potential attack is detected.

58 Employing evasive manoeuvres and hoses must rest on a determination to successfully deter attackers or to delay their boarding to allow all crew members to gain the sanctuary of secure areas. Continued heavy wheel movements with attackers on board may lessen their confidence that they will be able to return safely to their craft and may persuade them to disembark quickly. However, responses of this kind could lead to reprisals by the attackers if they seize crew members and should not be engaged in unless the master is convinced he can use them to advantage and without risk to those on board. They should not be used if the attackers have already seized crew members.

Firearms

59 With respect to the carriage of firearms on board, masters, shipowners and companies should be aware that ships entering the territorial sea and/or ports of a State are subject to that State’s legislation. It should be borne in mind that importation of firearms is subject to port and coastal State regulations. It should also be borne in mind that carrying firearms may pose an even greater danger if the ship is carrying flammable cargo or similar types of dangerous goods.

Non-arming of seafarers

60 The carrying and use of firearms by seafarers for personal protection or for the protection of a ship is strongly discouraged. Seafarers are civilians and the use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ship is great. Carriage of arms on board ship may encourage attackers to carry firearms or even more dangerous weapons, thereby escalating an already dangerous situation. Any firearm on board may itself become an attractive target for an attacker.

61 It should also be borne in mind that shooting at suspected pirates may impose a legal risk for the master, shipowner or company, such as collateral damages. In some jurisdictions, killing a national may have unforeseen consequences even for a person who believes he or she has acted in self defence. Also the differing customs or security requirements for the carriage and importation of firearms should be considered, as taking a small handgun into the territory of some countries may be considered an offence.
Use of unarmed security personnel

62 The use of unarmed security personnel is a matter for individual shipowners, companies, and ship operators to decide. The use of unarmed security personnel to provide security advice and an enhanced lookout capability could be considered.

Use of privately contracted armed security personnel

63 If armed security personnel are allowed on board, the master, shipowner, operator and company should take into account the possible escalation of violence and other risks. However, the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board merchant ships and fishing vessels is a matter for flag State to determine in consultation with shipowners, operators and companies. Masters, shipowners, operators and companies should contact the flag State and seek clarity of the national policy with respect to the carriage of armed security personnel. All legal requirements of flag, port and coastal States should be met.

Military teams or law enforcement officers duly authorized by Government

64 The use of military teams or law enforcement officers duly authorized by the Government of the flag State to carry firearms for the security of merchant ships or fishing vessels is a matter for the flag State to authorize in consultation with shipowners, operators and companies. The carriage of such teams may be required or recommended when the ship is transiting or operating in areas of high risk. Due to rules of engagement defined by their Government, or in coalition with other Governments, boarding conditions should be defined by the States involved, including the flag State. The shipowner, operator and company should always consult the flag State prior to embarking such teams.

The phases of suspected or attempted piracy/armed robbery attack

Suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected

65 Early detection of suspected attacks must be the first line of defence. If the vigilance and surveillance has been successful, a pirate/armed robbery vessel will be detected early. This is the stage at which the security forces of the nearest littoral or coastal State must be informed through the RCC, using the ships’ message format contained in Appendix 4. The ship’s crew should be warned and, if not already in their defensive positions, they should move to them. Appropriate passive and active measures, such as evasive manoeuvres and hoses should be vigorously employed as detailed in the preparation phase or in the ship’s security plan.

66 Shipowners, company, ship operator and master should be aware of any UN Security Council, IMO or any other UN resolutions on piracy and armed robbery against ships and any recommendations therein relevant to the shipowner, operator, master and crew when operating in areas where piracy or armed robbery against ships occur.

Being certain that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted

67 If not already in touch with the security forces of the littoral coastal State, efforts should be made to establish contact. Crew preparations should be completed and, where a local rule of the road allows ships under attack to do so, a combination of sound and light signals
should be made to warn other ships in the vicinity that an attack is about to take place. Vigorous manoeuvring should be continued and maximum speed should be sustained if navigation conditions permit. Nothing in these guidelines should be read as limiting the master’s authority to take action deemed necessary by the master to protect the lives of passengers and crew.

**Pirate/armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship**

68 Vigorous use of hoses in the boarding area should be continued. It may be possible to cast off grappling hooks and poles, provided the ship’s crews are not put to unnecessary danger.

69 While giving due consideration to safety of crew, vessel and environment it is recommended that masters should not slow down and stop, as far as practicable, when pursued by or fired upon by pirates/armed robbers intending to board and hijack the vessel. Where the pirates/armed robbers operate from a mother ship, masters should consider steering away from the mother ship thus increasing the distance between the attacking craft and the mother ship.

**Pirates/armed robbers start to board ship**

70 Timing during this phase will be critical and as soon as it is appreciated that a boarding is inevitable all crew should be ordered to seek their secure positions and activate any systems for raising the alarm including the ship security alert system.

**Pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship**

71 Early detection of potential attacks must be the first line of defence, action to prevent the attackers actually boarding the second, but there will be incidents when attackers succeed in boarding a ship. The majority of pirates and armed robbers are opportunists seeking an easy target and time may not be on their side, particularly if the crews are aware they are on board and are raising the alarm. However, the attackers may seek to compensate for the pressure of time they face by escalating their threats or the violence they employ. When attackers are on board the actions of the master and crew should be aimed at:

- .1 securing the greatest level of safety for those on board the ship;
- .2 seeking to ensure that the crew remain in control of the navigation of the ship; and
- .3 securing the earliest possible departure of the attackers from the ship.

72 The options available to the master and crew will depend on the extent to which the attackers have secured control of the ship, e.g., by having gained access to the bridge or engine-room, or by seizing crew members who they can threaten, to force the master or crew to comply with their wishes. However, even if the crew are all safely within secure areas, the master will always have to consider the risk to the ship the attackers could cause outside those areas, e.g., by using firebombs to start fires on a tanker or chemical carrier.

73 If the master is certain that all his/her crew are within secure areas and that the attackers cannot gain access or by their actions outside the secure areas they do not place the entire
ship at imminent risk, then he/she may consider undertaking evasive manoeuvres of the type referred to above to encourage the attackers to return to their craft.

74 The possibility of a sortie by a well-organized crew has, in the past, successfully persuaded attackers to leave a ship but the use of this tactic is only appropriate if it can be undertaken at no risk to the crew. For an action like this to be attempted the master must have clear knowledge of where the attackers are on the ship, that they are not carrying firearms or other potentially lethal weapons and that the number of crew involved significantly outnumbers the attackers they will face. If a sortie party can use water hoses, they stand an increased chance of success. The intention should be to encourage the attackers back to their craft. Crew members should not seek to come between the attackers and their craft nor should they seek to capture attackers as to do so may increase the resistance the attackers offer which will, in turn, increase the risk faced by members of the sortie party. Once outside the secure area, the sortie party should always stay together. Pursuit of an individual attacker by a lone crew member may be attractive but if it results in the crew member being isolated and seized by the attackers, the advantage turns to the attackers. Crew members should operate together and remain in constant communication with the bridge and should be recalled if their line of withdrawal to a secure area is threatened.

75 If the crew do apprehend an attacker, he/she should be placed in secure confinement and well cared for. Arrangements should be made to transfer him/her to the custody of officers of the security forces of a coastal State at the earliest possible opportunity. Any evidence relating to these activities should also be handed over to the authorities who take him/her into custody.

The pirates/armed robbers begin to gain control and take one or more of the ship’s crew into their custody

76 If the attackers have gained control of the engine-room or bridge, have seized crew members or can pose an imminent threat to the safety of a ship, the master or officer in charge should remain calm and, if possible, seek to negotiate with the attackers with the intention of maintaining the crew’s control over the navigation of the ship, the safe return of any hostages they may hold and the early departure of the attackers from the ship. There will be many circumstances when compliance with the attackers’ demands will be the only safe alternative and resistance or obstruction of any kind could be both futile and dangerous. An extract from United Nations Guidance on surviving as a hostage is given in Appendix 4.

77 In the event of attackers gaining temporary control of the ship, crew members should, if it is safe and practicable, leave Close Circuit Television (CCTV) records running.

78 As there have been occasions when entire crews have been locked up, consideration should be given to secreting equipment within areas in which the crew could be detained to facilitate their early escape.

79 In the event of hijacking a ship, the shipping company should seek expert advice and assistance from professionals to the effect of the safe return of the crew, as handling these situations have shown to be time-consuming and stressful for all parties involved.
The pirates/armed robbers have stolen property/money, etc.

80 At this stage it is essential that the pirates/armed robbers are assured that they have been given everything they demand and a strong reassurance that nothing has been secreted may persuade the pirates/armed robbers to leave.

The pirates/armed robbers start to disembark from the ship

81 If the crew are in their secure positions, it would be unwise of them to leave this security until it is confirmed that the pirates/armed robbers have left the ship.

The pirates/armed robbers have disembarked from the ship

82 A pre-arranged signal on the ship’s siren will alert the crew to the “all clear”. The company Security Officer should be informed accordingly.

Action after an attack and reporting incidents

83 Immediately after securing the safety of the ship and crew a post attack report (Follow-up report, as shown in Ships’ message formats in Appendix 5) should be made to the relevant RCC and, through them, to the security forces of the coastal State concerned. As well as information on the identity and location of the ship, any injuries to crew members or damage to the ship should be reported, as should the direction in which the attackers departed together with brief details of their numbers and, if possible, a description of their craft. If the crew have apprehended an attacker, that should also be reported in this report.

84 If an attack has resulted in the death of, or serious injury to, any person on board the ship or serious damage to the ship itself, an immediate report should also be sent to the ship’s maritime Administration. In any event a report of an attack is vital if follow-up action is to be taken by the ship’s maritime Administration. The shipowner, companies, ship operators, shipmasters and crew should cooperate with the investigators and provide the requested information.

85 Any CCTV or other recording of the incident should be secured. If practicable, areas that have been damaged or rifled should be secured and remain untouched by crew members pending possible forensic examination by the security forces of a coastal State. Crew members who came into contact with the attackers should be asked to prepare an individual report on their experience noting, in particular, any distinguishing features which could help subsequent identification of the attackers. A full inventory, including a description of any personal possessions or equipment taken, with serial numbers when known, should also be prepared.

86 As soon as possible after the incident, a fuller report should be transmitted to the authorities of the coastal State in whose waters the attack occurred or, if on the high seas, to the authorities of the nearest coastal State. Due and serious consideration should be given to complying with any request made by the competent authorities of the coastal State to allow officers of the security forces to board the ship, take statements from crew members and undertake forensic and other investigations. Copies of any CCTV recordings, photographs, etc., should be provided if they are available.
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN TO PREVENT ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY

87 Ships should take the necessary precautions, and implement the necessary procedures to ensure rapid reporting of any case of attack or attempted attack to the authorities in the relevant coastal States to enhance the possibility of security forces apprehending the attackers.

88 Any report transmitted to a coastal State should also be transmitted to the ship’s maritime Administration at the earliest opportunity. A complete report of the incident, including details of any follow-up action that was taken or difficulties that may have been experienced, should eventually be submitted to the ship’s maritime Administration. The report received by maritime Administrations may be used in any diplomatic approaches made by the flag State to the Government of the coastal State in which the incident occurred. This will also provide the basis for the report to IMO.

89 The format required for reports to IMO through maritime Administrations or international organizations is attached at Appendix 6. Indeed, at present the lack of adequate and accurate reporting of attacks is directly affecting the ability to secure governmental and international action. Reports may also contribute to future refining and updating any advice that might be issued to ships.

90 Reports to the RCC, coastal State and the ship’s maritime Administration should also be made if an attack has been unsuccessful.

91 Using RCCs, as recommended by IMO in MSC/Circ.1073, will eliminate communication difficulties.

On leaving piracy/armed robbery high-risk/high-probability areas

92 On leaving piracy/armed robbery threat areas, shipmasters should make certain that those spaces that need to be unlocked for safety reasons are unlocked, unrig hoses and revert to normal watchkeeping/lighting. However, though ships may be operating outside high-risk/high-probability areas, ship masters may, at their discretion, have ready their anti-piracy/robbery measures in view that the pirates/robbers may attack outside these areas.

Post-incident follow-up

93 A debriefing should be conducted by the owner/master, SSO and CSO to learn from the attack and identify areas of improvement. The debriefing should be conducted immediately after the incident so that the events are fresh and should involve the entire crew.

94 The shipowner should be aware that the seafarer may suffer from trauma or similar condition after being victimized under an attack from pirates or armed robbers. The shipowner should offer advice from professionals if the seafarer wishes such assistance. An important first step in reducing the risk from trauma is for masters to debrief crew immediately after the attack or release of a vessel in order to get crew to confront their experiences. An important second step is for counselling professionals to debrief crew as soon as possible after the attack or release of the vessel in order to assist the crew to manage their experiences.
APPENDIX 1

Flow diagram for attacks in coastal waters

- Victim ship
  - Owner or Operator
    - RCC of the coastal State
      - Security forces of the coastal State
      - IMO Members
        - IMO
        - Flag State
          - RPC of IMB
            - Kuala Lumpur
  - RCC of adjacent coastal State
    - Security forces of adjacent coastal State

- Radio/GMDSS
- Fastest means, not radio
- Follow-up by letter, fax, email or telex

Notes:

Ships and owners

Broadcast to ships

IMO T323E (16)+GN.indd   45
23/12/10   11:05:19
APPENDIX 2

Flow diagram for reporting incidents in Asia

Legend:
- Radio/GMDSS
- Fastest means
- Follow-up comms

Notes:
1. In the Asian region, the RCCs of some ReCAAP Contracting Parties are also their ReCAAP Focal Points (FPs). These Focal Points also disseminate incident information internally to their respective RCCs, maritime authorities and law enforcement agencies as appropriate.
2. Coastal States (in the context of this addendum) refer only to those who are Contracting Parties to the ReCAAP.
3. The incident reporting process in Asia does not change other reporting processes for incidents already in practice.
### APPENDIX 3

**“PHASES” RELATED TO VOYAGES IN PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY THREAT AREAS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase Symbol</th>
<th>Phase Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Approaching a piracy/armed robbery threat area (1 hour prior to entering)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Entering a piracy/armed robbery threat area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Inside a piracy/armed robbery threat area, but no suspect piracy/armed robbery vessel detected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Inside a piracy/armed robbery threat area: suspect piracy/armed robbery vessel detected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Certainty that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Pirate/armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Pirates/armed robbers start attempts to enter ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Pirates/armed robbers have one or more of the ship’s personnel in their control/custody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>The pirates/armed robbers have gained access to the bridge or the master’s office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>The pirates/armed robbers have stolen property/money, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>The pirates/armed robbers start to disembark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>The pirates/armed robbers have disembarked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>The pirate/armed robbery vessel is no longer in contact with the ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Own ship leaves the piracy/armed robbery threat area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4

EXTRACT FROM UN GUIDANCE ON SURVIVING AS A HOSTAGE

Introduction

Over the past few years the number of seafarers who have been kidnapped or taken hostage has increased substantially. Every hostage or kidnap situation is different. There are no strict rules of behaviour; however, there are a number of steps which you can take to minimize the effects of detention and enhance your ability to cope and to see the incident through to a successful release.

Survival considerations

These techniques have been successfully employed by others who have been taken hostage:

1. No one can tell an individual whether he or she should resist or not if taken hostage/kidnapped. This decision must be made by each person's own assessment of the circumstances. Resisting the attempt may be extremely risky. You may be injured if you attempt to resist armed individuals. It is possible that you will immediately be blindfolded and drugged.

2. Being taken hostage is probably one of the most devastating experiences a seafarer can undergo. The first 15 to 45 minutes of a hostage situation are the most dangerous. Follow the instructions of your captors. They are in a highly emotional state, regardless of whether they are psychologically unstable or caught in an untenable situation. They are in a fight or flight reactive state and could strike out. Your job is to survive. After the initial shock wears off, your captors are able to better recognize their position. Be certain you can explain everything on your person.

3. Immediately after you have been taken, pause, take a deep breath and try to relax. Fear of death or injury is a normal reaction to this situation. Recognizing your reactions may help you adapt more effectively. A hostage usually experiences greatest anxiety in the hours following the incident. This anxiety will begin to decline when the person realized he/she is still alive – at least for now – and a certain routine sets in. Feelings of depression and helplessness will continue throughout captivity and most hostages will feel deeply humiliated by what they undergo during captivity. Most hostages, however, will quickly adapt to the situation. Remember your responsibility is to survive.

4. Do not be a hero; do not talk back or act “tough”. Accept your situation. Any action on your part could bring a violent reaction from your captors. Past experiences show that those who react aggressively place themselves at greater risk than those who behave passively.

5. Keep a low profile. Avoid appearing to study your abductors, although, to the extent possible, you should make mental notes about their mannerisms, clothes and apparent rank structure. This may help the authorities after your release.
• Be cooperative and obey hostage-takers’ demands without appearing either
servile or antagonistic. Be conscious of your body language as well as your
speech. Respond simply if you are asked questions by the hijackers. Do not say
or do anything to arouse the hostility or suspicious of your captors. Do not be
argumentative. Act neutral and be a good listener to your captors. Do not speak
unless spoken to and then only when necessary. Be cautious about making
suggestions to your captors, as you may be held responsible if something you
suggest goes wrong.

• Anticipate isolation and possible efforts by the hostage-takers to disorient you.
Your watch may be taken away so you are unable to determine whether it is night
or day. Nevertheless, try to maintain a routine.

• Try to appear uninterested as to what is going on around you. Sleep, read a book,
etc. When so occupied, you will be less influenced by what is going on around you,
and hijackers do not bother people who are not a threat to them.

• Try to keep cool by focusing your mind on pleasant scenes or memories or prayers.
Try to recall the plots of movies or books. This will keep you mentally active.
You must try to think positively. Try to maintain a sense of humour. It will lessen
anxiety.

• Ask for anything you need or want (medicines, books, paper). All they can say is
no.

• Build rapport with your captors. Find areas of mutual interest which emphasize
personal rather than political interests. An excellent topic of discussion is family
and children. If you speak their language, use it – it will enhance communications
and rapport.

• Bear in mind that hostages often develop a positive attitude towards their captors.
This is known as “Stockholm Syndrome”, after an incident involving hostages at a
Swedish bank. In addition, as the hostage identifies with his/her captors, a negative
attitude towards those on the outside may develop.

• You may be asked to sign notes verifying that you are alive or you may be asked to
write a “confession” that you or the organization have been involved in nefarious
activities. The decision to sign these is an individual one based on the situation.
Some hostages refuse to sign unless the language of the note is changed. This
may help bolster your morale and make your feel less helpless. It can also serve to
command a certain degree of respect from the captors.

• Exercise daily. Develop a daily physical fitness programme and stick to it. Exercises
will keep your mind off the incident and will keep your body stimulated. If possible,
stay well-groomed and clean.

• As a result of the hostage situation, you may have difficulty retaining fluids and
may experience a loss of appetite and weight. Try to drink water and eat even if
you are not hungry. It is important to maintain your strength.

• Do not make threats against hostage-takers or give any indication that you would
testify against them. If hostage-takers are attempting to conceal their identity, give
no indication that you recognize them.
Try to think of persuasive reasons why hostage-takers should not harm you. Encourage them to let authorities know your whereabouts and condition. Suggest ways in which you may benefit your captors in negotiations that would free you. It is important that your abductors view you as a person worthy of compassion and mercy. Never beg, plead or cry. You must gain your captors’ respect as well as sympathy.

If you end up serving as a negotiator between hostage-takers and authorities, make sure the messages are conveyed accurately. Be prepared to speak on the radio or telephone.

Escape only if you are sure you will be successful. If you are caught, your captors may use violence to teach you and others a lesson.

At every opportunity, emphasize that, as a seafarer you are neutral and not involved in politics.

If there is a rescue attempt by force, drop quickly to the floor and seek cover. Keep your hands over your head. When appropriate, identify yourself. In many cases, former hostages feel bitter about the treatment they receive after their release. Most hostages feel a strong need to tell their story in detail. If assistance in this regard is not provided, request a post-traumatic stress debriefing. Bear in mind that the emotional problems of a former hostage do not appear immediately. Sometimes they appear months later. Whatever happens, readjustment after the incident is a slow process requiring patience and understanding. As soon as the hostage realizes that he or she is a normal person having a normal reaction to an abnormal situation, the healing process can begin.

Be patient.
APPENDIX 5

SHIPS' MESSAGE FORMATS

Report 1 – Initial message – Piracy/armed robbery attack alert

1 Ship’s name and, call sign, IMO number, INMARSAT IDs (plus ocean region code) and MMSI

MAYDAY/DISTRESS ALERT (see note)
URGENCY SIGNAL
PIRACY/ARMED ROBBERY ATTACK

2 Ship’s position (and time of position UTC)

Latitude   Longitude
Course Speed   KTS

3 Nature of event

Note: It is expected that this message will be a distress message because the ship or persons will be in grave or imminent danger when under attack. Where this is not the case, the word MAYDAY/DISTRESS ALERT is to be omitted.

Use of distress priority (3) in the INMARSAT system will not require MAYDAY/DISTRESS ALERT to be included.

Report 2 – Follow-up report – Piracy/armed robbery attack alert

1 Ship’s name and, callsign, IMO number

2 Reference initial PIRACY/ARMED ROBBERY ALERT

3 Position of incident

Latitude   Longitude
Name of the area

4 Details of incident, e.g.:

While sailing, at anchor or at berth? Method of attack Description/number of suspect craft Number and brief description of pirates/robbers What kind of weapons did the pirates/robbers carry? Any other information (e.g., language spoken) Injuries to crew and passengers Damage to ship (Which part of the ship was attacked?) Brief details of stolen property/cargo Action taken by the master and crew Was incident reported to the coastal authority and to whom? Action taken by the Coastal State
5 Last observed movements of pirate/suspect craft, e.g.:
   Date/time/course/position/speed

6 Assistance required

7 Preferred communications with reporting ship, e.g.:
   Appropriate Coast Radio Station
   HF/MF/VHF
   INMARSAT IDs (plus ocean region code)
   MMSI

8 Date/time of report (UTC)
APPENDIX 6

FORMAT FOR REPORTING TO IMO THROUGH MARITIME ADMINISTRATIONS OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Ship's name and IMO number
   Type of ship
   Flag
   Gross tonnage

2. Date and time

3. Latitude  Longitude
   Name of the area
   While sailing, at anchor or at berth?

4. Method of attack
   Description/number of suspect craft
   Number and brief description of pirates/robbers
   What kind of weapons did the pirates/robbers carry?
   Any other information (e.g., language spoken)

5. Injuries to crew and passengers
   Damage to ship (Which part of the ship was attacked?)
   Brief details of stolen property/cargo

6. Action taken by the master and crew

7. Was incident reported to the coastal authority and to whom?

8. Reporting State or international organization

9. Action taken by the coastal State

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1 Corresponding to the column numbers in the annex to the IMO monthly circulars

2 The following definition of piracy is contained in article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

"Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
   (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
   (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)."
APPENDIX 7
DECALOGUE OF SAFETY

1 Watch over the ship and the cargo

It is the duty of every Master to take care of the cargo and take precautionary measures for the complete safety of the ship, as well as that of the activities carried out on board by the crew or other persons employed on board. All crew members should co-operate in the vigilance, in their own interests, communicating any suspicious activity to the Officer of the Watch.

2 Illuminate the ship and its side

Keep the ship illuminated, particularly, the outer side and the whole length of the deck, using high powered floodlights. Bad visibility impedes the action of the watchmen, constituting a favourable factor for unlawful activities. Do not forget what is recommended in rules 2 and 30 of the COLREG.

3 Establish communication for outside support

Whenever possible, install a telephone line with easy access for the watchman or crew member on duty. Ask for assistance by the telephone.

Remember also the list of stations which will be on permanent watch on VHF – channel 16. These stations can forward the request for assistance to the competent authorities.

4 Control of accesses to the cargo and to living quarters

The Master’s cabin is one of the main objectives of the assailants who are looking for money and the master keys to other living quarters, to steal the crew’s personal effects of value and nautical equipment from the bridge. The cabins and other living quarters should be kept locked whenever their occupants are absent.

Normally cargo will only be the object of robbery or theft if the criminals have advance knowledge of the contents, through information collected by unscrupulous persons who have access to the bill of lading. Attempt to stow the containers with valuable cargo in a manner to obstruct their doors. Isolate the means of access to the ship and also the accesses to the internal areas, creating a sole way of entry and exit by the gangway, guaranteeing its control by the watchman posted there.

5 Keep the portholes closed

Open portholes can be an easy access to clever criminals: close them with the clips in place always when you leave. Try also to keep the accesses to internal areas locked, guaranteeing the entry and exit by the gangway watchman.
6 Do not leave valuables exposed

Try to reduce the opportunities of robbery by putting all portable equipment which is not in use to its place of storage. Valuables left exposed tempt opportunistic thieves, keep them in safe place under lock and key.

7 Keep the gangways raised

At anchorages and in port, make the access difficult by keeping the gangways and rope ladders raised. In port, only leave the gangway to the dockside down.

8 In case of an assault

I - do not hesitate to sound the ship’s general alarm in case of a threat of assault;

II - try to keep adequate lighting to permanently dazzle the opponents, in case of an attempt by strangers to climb the ship’s side;

III - raise the alarm, by VHF – channel 16, to the ships in the area and to the permanent watch system of the authorities ashore (cite the existing structure in the port). The efficiency of assistance by the security forces depends on an early alarm;

IV - sound the alarm with intermittent blasts on the siren and use visual alarms with floodlights and signalling rockets;

V - if appropriate, to protect the lives of those onboard, use measures to repel the boarding by employing powerful floodlights for dazzling the aggressors or using jets of water or signalling rockets against the areas of boarding; and

VI - do not attempt any heroic acts.

9 Keep the contracted watchmen under the control of the officer of the watch

Demand a good watchman service. Make them identify all persons that enter and leave the ship. Recommend that the crew co-operate with the control. Do not allow the watchman to leave the gangway, unless he is relieved by another watchman or a crew member.

10 Communicate to the police any occurrence relating to robbery, theft or assault

Occurrences involving assault or robbery should be communicated to the Security forces, for the pertinent legal steps to be taken.

This information will make possible the study of measures to be adopted for the prevention and combat of these crimes, contributing to guaranteeing the safety of the crew and the ship.
Annex II

MSC.1/Circ.1335
Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia – Best management practices to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia developed by the industry
MSC.1/Circ.1335 of 29 September 2009

1 The Maritime Safety Committee (the Committee), at its eighty-sixth session (27 May to 5 June 2009), approved, inter alia:

.1 MSC.1/Circ.1332 on Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia;
.2 MSC.1/Circ.1333 on Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships; and
.3 MSC.1/Circ.1334 on Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

2 It is recalled that annex 1 to MSC.1/Circ.1332, in essence, disseminates the February 2009 version of the Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia (Best management practices) developed by eleven industry organizations.

3 Following the publication of MSC.1/Circ.1332, twelve industry organizations have analyzed the experience gained by those who implemented the February 2009 version of the Best management practices and have developed a revised version which amplifies and clarifies a number of issues set out in the original.

4 The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), acting on behalf of the industry organizations who contributed to the development of, or have declared their support for, the Best management practices, has requested the Organization to circulate the most recent version (August 2009) of the Best management practices, as set out in annex 1.

5 Member Governments are invited to consider the Best management practices as set out in annex 2, and to advise owners, operators and managers of ships entitled to fly their flag, as well as the shipboard personnel employed or engaged on such ships, to act accordingly taking into account the guidance provided in MSC.1/Circ.1333 and 1334.

6 Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations with consultative status are also invited to consider the Best management practices as set out in annex 2 and to advise their membership to act accordingly, taking into account the guidance provided in MSC.1/Circ.1333 and 1334.

7 Member Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations with consultative status are invited to consider bringing the results of the experience gained from using the Best management practices as set out in annex 2 to the attention of the Committee.

8 For ease of reference, the additional guidance for vessels engaged in fishing which formed annex 2 to MSC.1/Circ.1332 has been appended as annex 3 to this circular.

9 This circular is issued following consultations with the Chairman of the Maritime Safety Committee.
ANNEX 1

International Chamber of Shipping

12 Carthusian Street London EC1M 6EZ

Tel +44 20 7417 8844
Fax +44 20 7417 8877

ics@marisec.org  www.marisec.org  www.shippingfacts.com

The Secretary-General
International Maritime Organization

15 September 2009

Dear Secretary-General,

I am writing on behalf of all twelve industry organisations that have contributed to the development of, and declared their support for, the “Best Management Practice to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia” (BMP). These organisations are listed below and it is emphasised that the document is a joint industry work and that it should be described as such.

The industry has always taken the view that the BMP should be updated as indicated by experience and sufficient feedback had been received to justify work on a revision in the summer of 2009. In late August, version 2 of the BMP was published and this version is now available on the industry association websites as well as on that of the appropriate military organisations.

Since it is important that the latest information is available to companies, masters and seafarers, it would be appreciated if IMO could circulate BMP version 2 and invite IMO member States to note the latest revised version of the BMP and inform all parties concerned accordingly.

Yours sincerely

P B Hinchliffe

On behalf of:

INTERTANKO  IG P&I
ICS  CLIA
OCIMF  IUMI
BIMCO  JWC/JHC
SIGTTO  IMB
INTERCARGO  ITF
ANNEX II: MSC.1/CIRC.1335

ANNEX 2

BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO DETER PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN AND OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA

(Version 2 – August 2009)

In an effort to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia, these best management practices are supported by the following international industry representatives:

1. International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)
2. International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)
3. Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
4. Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)
5. Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SITGTO)
6. International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO)
7. International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs (IGP&I)
8. Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
9. International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI)
10. Joint War Committee (JWC) & Joint Hull Committee (JHC)
11. International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
12. International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF)

These best management practices are also supported by:

1) Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
2) UK Maritime Trade Organisation (UKMTO Dubai)
3) Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO)

SUGGESTED PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICES FOR OWNERS, OPERATORS, MANAGERS AND MASTERS OF SHIPS TRANSITING THE GULF OF ADEN AND OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA

PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this document is to provide Best Management Practices (BMP) to assist companies and ships in avoiding piracy attacks, deterring attacks and delaying successful attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GoA) and off the Coast of Somalia. The organizations consulted on this document represent the vast majority of ship owners and operators transiting the region.
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN TO PREVENT ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY

2. These organizations will encourage their members to utilize these BMP and will endeavour to promulgate these to other shipping interests as BMP for combating piracy in the region. This document complements guidance provided in the IMO circular MSC.1/Circ.1334.

TYPICAL ATTACK PROFILES AND LESSONS LEARNT

1. During 2008, and the first half of 2009, an increase in the number of pirate attacks on merchant ships occurred throughout the GoA and off the coast of Somalia and within the wider North West Indian Ocean. The majority of attacks were initially clustered around the northern side of the GoA but attacks have occurred further off the east coast of Somalia.

2. Analysis of successful attacks indicates that the following common vulnerabilities are exploited by the pirates:
   a. Low speed
   b. Low freeboard
   c. Inadequate planning and procedures
   d. Visibly low state of alert and/or lack of evident self-protective measures
   e. Where a slow response by the ship is evident

3. Commonly two or more small high-speed (up to 25 knots) open boats/"skiffs" are used in attacks often approaching from the port quarter and/or stern.

4. The use of a pirate “mother ship”, which is a larger ship carrying personnel, equipment, supplies and smaller attack craft, has enabled attacks to be successfully undertaken at a greater range from the shore.

5. Vigilance should be highest at first light and last light, as the majority of the attacks have taken place during these periods.

6. Higher speed vessels (15 knots and above) should not presume to be safe from attack but speed is an effective form of defence. The use of small arms fire, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), in an effort to intimidate masters of vessels to reduce speed has occurred within the area. Maintaining full sea speed in such circumstances has been shown to be effective.

7. The majority of attempted hijacks have been repelled by ship’s crew who have planned and trained in advance of the passage and employed passive counter measures to good effect.

8. Prevailing weather and sea state conditions also greatly influence attackers’ ability to operate. Wind strengths in excess of 18 knots and wave heights above 2 metres are considered sufficient to provide protection for all but the most vulnerable vessels, particularly where masters are taking full account of Best Management Practices.
RECOMMENDED BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

1. Introduction
   a. Whilst recognizing the absolute discretion of the master at all times to adopt appropriate measures to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks in this region, this document of best practices is provided for shipowners and ship operators, masters and their crews.
   b. Not all measures discussed in this document may be applicable for each ship. Therefore, as part of the risk analysis, an assessment is recommended to determine which of the BMP will be most suitable for the ship. The following have, however, generally proved effective:

2. Prior to transit – general planning
   a. General
      i. UKMTO Dubai is the first point of contact for ships in the region. The day-to-day interface between masters and the military is provided by UKMTO Dubai, who talk to the ships and liaise directly with MSCHOA and the naval commanders at sea. UKMTO Dubai require regular updates on the position and intended movements of ships. They use this information to help the naval units maintain an accurate picture of shipping. (See Glossary at Annex A for further details.)
      ii. The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), is the planning and coordination authority for EU forces (EU NAVFOR) in the Gulf of Aden and the area off the Coast of Somalia. (See Glossary at Annex A.)
      iii. The Marine Liaison Office (MARLO) operates as a conduit for information exchange between the Combined Maritime forces (CMF) and the commercial shipping community within the region. (See Glossary at Annex A.)
      iv. Prior to transiting the high risk area, the owner and master should carry out their own risk assessment to assess the likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks on the ship, based on the latest available information. The outcome of this risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery and will mean combining statutory requirements with supplementary measures to combat piracy.
      v. Company crisis management procedures should consider appropriate measures to meet the threat of piracy by adopting IMO and other industry recommended practices as appropriate to the particular circumstances and ship type.
      vi. Advanced notice of a vessel’s intended passage is required by the naval authorities so that they can identify vulnerabilities and plan suitable protection. This is achieved by primarily:
         1) Initial report to UKMTO Dubai, (e-mail or fax).
         2) Initial report to MARLO (e-mail or fax).
         3) Additionally, if planning to transit the Gulf of Aden, or navigate within the area bound by 12° N, 58° E & 10° S: Register the Vessel Movement with MSCHOA (either, online or by e-mail or fax).

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vi. Whilst measures should be taken to prevent pirates boarding, the safety of crew and passengers is paramount.

b. **Company planning:**

It is strongly recommended that managers and/or the operations department register for access to the restricted sections of the MSCHOA website (www.mschoa.eu), review the information contained therein and share this as appropriate within their fleet.

i. 4-5 days before the vessel enters the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), or area bound by 12 degrees North or 58 degrees East or 10 degrees South, ensure that a “Vessel Movement Registration” submission has been logged with MSCHOA (online, e-mail or fax). **Note:** This can be done by either the ship or the company.

ii. Review the Ship Security Assessment (SSA) and implementation of the Ship Security Plan (SSP) as required by the International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS) to counter the piracy threat.

iii. The Company Security Officer (CSO) is encouraged to see that a contingency plan for the high risk passage is in place, exercised, briefed and discussed with the master and the Ship Security Officer (SSO).

iv. Be aware of the particular high risk sea areas that have been promulgated.

v. Offer their ship’s master guidance with regard to the preferred and available methods of transiting the region (Group Transit, Escorted Group Transit, National Convoy, etc.).

vi. Conduct periodic crew training sessions.

vii. The use of additional private security guards is at the discretion of the company but the use of armed guards is not recommended.

viii. Consider additional resources to enhance watchkeeping numbers.

ix. Consider the outfitting of ships with Self Protection Measures (SPM) prior to transiting high-risk areas.

c. **Ship’s master planning:**

i. Communication of “Initial Report” to UKMTO Dubai and MARLO (e-mail or fax) when entering the reporting area between Suez, and 78 degrees East 10 degrees South, see Anti-Piracy Planning chart Q6099.

ii. 4-5 days before entering the IRTC, or the area within 12 degrees North, 58 degrees East or 10 degrees South, ensure that a “Vessel Movement Registration” submission has been logged with MSCHOA (online, e-mail or fax). **Note:** This can be done by either the ship or the company. If it is completed by the company, masters should satisfy themselves with their companies that their details are correctly registered with MSCHOA.

iii. Prior to transit of the region it is recommended that the crew should be thoroughly briefed.

iv. The anti-piracy contingency plan has been shown to be most effective when implemented in advance. A drill is conducted prior to arrival in the area, the
plan reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties, including familiarity with the alarm signal signifying a piracy attack.

v. Masters are advised to also prepare an emergency communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact numbers and pre-prepared messages, which should be ready at hand or permanently displayed near the communications panel (e.g., telephone numbers of MSCHOA, IMB PRC, CSO, etc. – see Contact List at Annex B).

vi. **Define the ship’s AIS policy:** SOLAS permits the master the discretion to switch off AIS if he believes that its use increases the ship’s vulnerability. However, in order to provide naval forces with tracking information within the GoA it is recommended that AIS transmission is continued but restricted to ship’s identity, position, course, speed, navigational status and safety-related information. Off the coast of Somalia the decision is again left to the master’s discretion, but current Naval advice is to turn it off completely. If in doubt this can be verified with MSCHOA.

3. **Prior to transit voyage planning**
   
a. Vessels are encouraged to report their noon position, course, speed, estimated and actual arrival times to UKMTO Dubai and MARLO whilst operating in the region.

b. Vessels are also encouraged to increase the frequency of such reports when navigating in known high risk/piracy areas and further report upon passing Point A or B in the GoA, as shown on Anti-Piracy Chart Q6099.

c. **Inside the GoA**
   
i. EUNAVFOR strongly recommends that ships conduct their passage within the IRTC. Westbound ships should bias themselves to the northern portion of the corridor, and eastbound ships to the southern portion. Group Transit (GT) guidance within the GoA for times and speeds are on the MSCHOA website, if a GT is contemplated.

ii. Ships should avoid entering Yemeni Territorial Waters (YTWs) while on transit. This is for reasons of customary international law, as it is not possible for international military forces (non-Yemeni) to protect ships that are attacked inside Yemeni TTW.

iii. Ships may be asked to make adjustments to passage plans to conform to MSCHOA routeing advice.

iv. During GTs ships should not expect to be permanently in the company of a warship. But all warships in the GoA, whether part of EUNAVFOR or coordinating with them, will be aware of the GoA GTs and will have access to the full details of vulnerable shipping.

v. MSCHOA strongly recommends masters make every effort to plan transit periods of highest risk areas of the GoA for night passage (MSCHOA will advise ships). Very few successful attacks have occurred at night.

d. **Outside the GoA**
   
i. Ships navigating off the east coast of Somalia should consult with the MSCHOA website or UKMTO Dubai in order to obtain the most recent routeing advice.
ii. Masters should still update UKMTO Dubai in the usual manner with their ship’s course and details.

e. A list of useful contact details are contained in Annex B.

4. Prior to transit – Defensive measures

a. Taking into account the manning levels, ensure that ship routines are adjusted sufficiently in advance so that well-rested and well-briefed crew are on watch and sufficient watch keepers are available. The Master and Officers of the Watch should be familiar with the impact of zig-zag manoeuvres on board their particular ship, (in all sea conditions) and in particular the impact that these manoeuvres can have upon reducing the speed of the vessel.

b. Consider minimizing external communications (radios, handsets and AIS information) to essential safety- and security-related communication and SOLAS information only, during transit of the GoA and passing the Coast of Somalia.

c. Increase readiness and redundancy by running additional auxiliary machinery, including generators and steering motors.

d. Increase lookouts/bridge manning.

e. Man the engine-room.

f. Secure and control access to the bridge, engine-room, steering gear room, and all accommodation/internal spaces. All potential access points (doors, portholes, vents, etc.) should be risk-assessed and adequately secured, especially where the potential access point is considered large enough for an attacker to gain entry. Access to and from the accommodation and internal work spaces should be reduced to a single point of entry when transiting the high risk areas. Any measures employed should not obstruct an emergency EXIT from within the internal space, whilst remaining secure from access by pirates outside.

g. In case of emergency, warships can be contacted on VHF Ch. 16 (Backup Ch.08).

h. Check all ladders and outboard equipment are stowed or up on deck.

i. Check that self-protection measures put in place in advance remain securely fitted and function as intended. Be mindful that temporary devices may work loose and consequently may only provide a reduced level of protection.

j. If the ship has a comparatively low freeboard, consider the possibility of extending the width of the gunwales to prevent grappling hooks from gaining hold. Check the MSCHOA website for examples of such measures.

k. It is recommended that a piracy attack muster point or “citadel” be designated and lock-down procedures rehearsed in order to delay access to control of the ship and buy time. Ideally this should be away from external bulkheads and portholes. Due to the ongoing debate on the use of citadels and their method of employment, masters are recommended to check regularly with MSCHOA.
l. Consider the use of dummies at the rails to simulate additional lookouts. However, if ship design creates lookout black spots and the security assessment identifies this risk, then it may have to be covered by manpower.

m. It is suggested fire pumps and/or hoses should be pressurised and ready for discharge overboard around the vessel, particularly at the most vulnerable points.

n. Consideration should also be given to creating a water curtain around the vessel to further deter boarding.

o. Consider the use of razor wire/physical barriers around stern/lowest points of access, commensurate with crew safety and escape.

p. Consider the use of passive defence equipment.

q. Consider providing night vision optics for use during the hours of darkness.

r. Operate CCTV (if fitted).

5. In Transit – Operations

a. Ship’s crew should not be exposed to undue risk when employing Self-Protective Measures (SPM).

b. All ships inside the GoA are strongly urged to use the IRTC and follow MSCHOA GT advice and timings as promulgated on the MSCHOA web site.

c. Attention of Mariners is also drawn toIMOcircular SN.1/Circ.281 dated 4 August 2009, “Information on Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC) for Ships Transiting the Gulf of Aden” where advice is provided that the IRTC is subject to change by military authorities according to prevailing circumstances. Mariners are therefore urged to obtain up-to-date information from the “MSCHOA” website http://www.mschoa.org or NAV-warnings promulgated for that area.

d. If you intend to follow a Group Transit (GT) through the IRTC: Transit at the group transit speed, but remain aware of the ship’s limitations. (Current advice, for example, is that if your full sea speed is 16 knots, consider joining a 14 knot GT and keep those 2 knots in reserve.)

e. If you do not intend to follow a GT through the IRTC: Maintain full sea speed through the high risk area. (Current advice is that if the full sea speed of the ship is more than 18 knots, then do not slow down for a GT. Instead, maintain full sea speed and aim to transit as much of the high risk area in darkness as possible.)

f. Ships should comply with the International Rules for Prevention of Collision at Sea at all times. Masters should endeavour not to impede the safe navigation of other vessels when joining and leaving the IRTC. Navigation lights should not be turned off at night. Follow the guidance given by Flag State Authority.

g. Provide deck lighting only as required for safety. Lighting in the shadow zones around the ship’s hull may extend the area of visibility for lookouts, but only where consistent with safe navigation. Where fitted, and deemed suitable, consider the immediate use of “remotely operated” ship search lights, if suspicious activity around the vessel is observed, the use of search lights may startle and deter a potential attack. (Current Naval advice is to transit with navigation lights only.)
h. Keep photographs of pirate “mother ships” on the bridge. Report immediately if sighted. Report all sightings of suspect mother ships to UKMTO Dubai and the IMB PRC. (See Annex C for an example of a Piracy Report for passing on such information or reporting on any other attack or sighting.)

i. The master should try to make as early an assessment of a threat as possible. As soon as the master feels that a threat is developing he should immediately call the UKMTO Dubai.

j. Keep a good lookout by all available means for suspicious craft, especially from astern and each quarter.

k. Protect the crew from exposure to undue risk. Only essential work on deck should occur in transit of the high risk area. Masters should, in so far as possible, keep crew members clear from external deck spaces during hours of darkness, whilst being mindful of their obligation to maintain a full and proper lookout at all times.

l. Use light, alarm bells and crew activity to alert suspected pirates that they have been detected.

m. A variety of other additional commercially available non-lethal defensive measures are available that could be considered; however these should be assessed by companies on their merits and on the particular characteristics and vulnerability of the ship concerned.

6. **If attacked by pirates**

   a. Follow the ship’s pre-prepared contingency plan.

   b. **Activate the Emergency Communication Plan, and report the attack immediately to the single primary point of contact in the event of an attack, which is UKMTO Dubai.** *(MSCHOA, as the continually manned maritime security watch centre for piracy attacks in the region, will continue to function as a back-up contact point in the event of an attack).*

   c. Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), which will alert your Company Security Officer and flag state. *Post attack reports should be communicated as quickly as possible to all relevant piracy reporting centres as explained in section 9.*

   d. If the master has exercised his right to turn off the Automatic Identification System (AIS) during transit of the piracy area, this should be turned on once the ship comes under pirate attack.

   e. Sound the emergency alarm and make a ‘pirate attack’ (PA) announcement in accordance with the ship’s emergency plan.

   f. Make a “Mayday” call on VHF Ch. 16 (and backup Ch. 08, which is monitored by naval units). Send a distress message via the DSC (Digital Selective Calling) system and Inmarsat-C, as applicable. Establish telephone communication with UKMTO Dubai.
g. Prevent skiffs closing on the ship by altering course and increasing speed where possible. Pirates have great difficulty boarding a ship that is:
   i. Making way at over 15 knots.
   ii. Manoeuvring – it is suggested that as early as possible masters undertake continuous small zigzag manoeuvres to further deter boarding whilst maintaining speed. Consider increasing the pirates’ exposure to wind/waves and using bow wave and stern wash to restrict pirate craft coming alongside. Masters and the Officer of the Watch (OOW) should be aware of the handling and manoeuvring characteristics of the vessel. Particular attention should be given to the effects of varying helm orders and the impact these can have on the ship’s speed.

h. Activate fire pump defensive measures.
   i. Consider turning on forward facing deck lights to draw attention to your vessel and aid positive identification by arriving military forces as a vessel under attack.
   j. Muster all remaining crew in accordance with the ship’s contingency plan.

7. **If boarded by pirates**
   a. Before pirates gain access to the bridge, inform UKMTO Dubai and, if time permits, the Company.
   b. Offer no resistance; this could lead to unnecessary violence and harm to the crew.
   c. If the bridge/engine-room is to be evacuated, then the main engine should be stopped; all way taken off the vessel if possible and the ship navigated clear of other ships.
   d. Remain calm and cooperate fully with the pirates.
   e. Ensure all crew, other than the bridge team, stay together in one location.
   f. If in a locked down “citadel” ensure internal protection/cover is available in case the pirates attempt to force entry. Keep clear of entry point/doors and portholes/windows – do not resist entry. Use citadel emergency communication methods to communicate with authorities.

8. **In the event of military action**
   a. Crew should be advised NOT to use cameras with flash at any time when any military action is underway.
   b. In the event that military personnel take action on board the ship, all personnel should keep low to the deck, cover their head with both hands, with hands visible and empty.
   c. Be prepared to answer questions on identity and status on board.
   d. Be aware that English is not the working language of all naval units in the region.

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1 If you can buy time until the military forces arrive, this often leads the pirates to abort their attack. This is why early registration with MSCHOA, use of Group Transit timings and updating your position with UKMTO Dubai are all essential: it gives a better probability that Naval support will be nearby if the pirates attack.
e. Military Forces may initially secure all persons encountered. This is standard practice. Brief and prepare ship’s personnel to expect this and to cooperate fully during the initial stages of military action on board.

9. Post incident reporting (Reference Annex C)
   a. Following any piracy attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is reported to MSCHOA, UKMTO DUBAI and the IMB.
   b. This will ensure full analysis and trends in piracy activity are established as well as enabling assessment of piracy techniques or changes in tactics, in addition to ensuring appropriate warnings can be issued to other Merchant shipping in the vicinity.
   c. Masters are therefore requested to complete the standardized piracy report form contained in Annex C.

Updating best management practices

1. It is anticipated that these BMP will be periodically updated based upon operational experience and lessons learned. The parties to this document will endeavour to meet regularly to update these BMP and to circulate revisions to their respective members and other interested organizations.

2. If in doubt, consult the MSCHOA website where additional relevant information will always be posted (noting that this may not be endorsed by all of the above-listed organizations).
APPENDIX 1

GLOSSARY

The roles and interrelationship of the coordinating bodies involved.

EUNAVFOR

EUNAVFOR is the coordinating authority which operates the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa). All information and contact details are to be found within the MSCHOA website.

MSC (HOA) Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa)

MSCHOA was set up by the European Union (EU) as part of a European Security and Defence Policy initiative to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa. This work commenced with the establishment of EU NAVCO in September 2008. This Coordination Cell working in Brussels established links with a broad cross-section of the maritime community and provided coordination with EU forces operating in the region. In November 2008, the Council of the European Union took a major step further by setting up a naval mission – EU NAVFOR ATALANTA – to improve maritime security off the Somali coast by preventing and deterring pirate attacks and by helping to safeguard merchant shipping in the region.

UKMTO Dubai – (UK) Maritime Trade Operations

The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO Dubai) office in Dubai acts as a point of contact for industry liaison with the Combined Military Forces (CMF). UKMTO Dubai also administers the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send daily reports, providing their position and ETA at their next port, whilst transiting the region bound by Suez, 78°E and 10°S. UKMTO Dubai subsequently tracks ships, and the positional information is passed to CMF and EU headquarters. Emerging and relevant information affecting commercial traffic can then be passed directly to ships, rather than by company offices, improving responsiveness to any incident and saving time.

For further information, or to join the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, please contact UKMTO Dubai: UKMTO@eim.ae
## APPENDIX 2

### USEFUL CONTACT DETAILS

**UKMTO Dubai**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E-mail</th>
<th><a href="mailto:UKMTO@eim.ae">UKMTO@eim.ae</a></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>+971 50 552 3215</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Fax</td>
<td>+971 4 306 5710</td>
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<tr>
<td>Telex</td>
<td>(51) 210473</td>
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**MSCHOA**

Via Website for reporting: [www.mschoa.org](http://www.mschoa.org)

| Telephone       | +44 (0) 1923 958545 |
| Fax             | +44 (0) 1923 958520 |
| E-mail          | postmaster@mschoa.org |

**IMB PRC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E-mail</th>
<th><a href="mailto:piracy@icc-ccs.org">piracy@icc-ccs.org</a></th>
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<td>Telephone</td>
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**MARLO**

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<tr>
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<td>+ 973 3944 2117</td>
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**APPENDIX 3**

**FOLLOW-UP REPORT – PIRACY ATTACK REPORT**

**VESSEL PARTICULARS/DETAILS**

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**DETAILS OF INCIDENT**

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ANNEX III: MSC.1/CIRC.1335

ANNEX 3

ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR VESSELS ENGAGED IN FISHING,
SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO
DETER PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN AND OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA

I  RECOMMENDATIONS TO VESSELS IN FISHING ZONES

1. Non-Somali fishing vessels should avoid operating or transiting within 200 nm of the coast of Somalia, irrespective of whether or not they had been issued with licences to do so.

2. Do not start fishing operations when the radar indicates the presence of unidentified boats.

3. If polyester skiffs of a type typically used by pirates are sighted, move away from them full speed, sailing into wind and sea to make their navigation more difficult.

4. Avoid stopping at night, be alert and maintain bridge, deck and engine-room watch.

5. During fishing operations, when the vessel is more vulnerable, be alert and maintain radar watch in order to give maximum notice to the Authorities if an attack is in course.

6. While navigating at night, use only the mandatory navigation and safety lights so as to prevent the glow of lighting attracting pirates who sometimes are in boats without radars and are just lurking around.

7. While the vessel is drifting while fishing at night, keep guard at the bridge on deck and in the engine-room. Use only mandatory navigation and safety lights. The engine must be ready for an immediate start up.

8. Keep away from unidentified ships.

9. Use VHF as little as possible to avoid being heard by pirates and make location more difficult.

10. Activate AIS when maritime patrol aircraft are operating in the area to facilitate identification and tracking.

II  IDENTIFICATION

1. Managers are strongly recommended to register their fishing vessels with MSCHOA for the whole period of activity off the coast of Somalia. This should include communicating a full list of the crewmen on board and their vessels’ intentions, if possible.

2. Carry out training prior to passage or fishing operations in the area.

3. Whenever fishing vessels are equipped with VMS devices, their manager should provide MSCHOA with access to VMS data.
4. Fishing vessels should avoid sailing through areas where they have been informed that suspected pirate “mother ships” had been identified and should use all means to detect, as soon as possible, any movement of large or small vessels that could be suspicious.

5. Fishing vessels should always identify themselves upon request from aircraft or ships from Operation ATALANTA or other international or national anti-piracy operation.

6. Military, merchant and fishing vessels should respond without delay to any identification request made by a fishing vessel being approached (in order to facilitate early action to make escape possible, especially if the vessel is fishing).

III IN CASE OF ATTACK

1. In case of an attack or sighting a suspicious craft, warn the Authorities (UKMTO and MSCHOA) and the rest of the fleet.

2. Communicate the contact details of the second master of the vessel (who is on land) whose knowledge of the vessel could contribute to the success of a military intervention.

Recommendations only for purse seiners

3. Evacuate all personnel from the deck and the crow’s nest.

4. If pirates have taken control of the vessel and the purse seine is spread out, encourage the pirates to allow the nets to be recovered. If recovery of the purse seine is allowed, follow the instructions for its stowage and explain the functioning of the gear in order to avoid misunderstanding.
Annex III

MSC.1/Circ.1333
Piracy and armed robbery against ships – Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships
MSC.1/Circ.1333 of 26 June 2009

1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eighty-sixth session (27 May to 5 June 2009), reviewed MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1 (Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships) and prepared the revised recommendations given in the annex.

2 The revision was carried out on the basis of the outcome of the comprehensive review of the guidance provided by the Organization for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships; and took into account the work of the correspondence group on the review and updating of MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1, MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 and resolution A.922(22), established by MSC 84.

3 Member Governments, in particular those within areas identified as affected by acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, are recommended to take any necessary action to implement, as appropriate, the recommendations given in the annex.

4 Member Governments are also recommended to bring this circular and MSC.1/Circ.1334 to the attention of all national agencies concerned with anti-piracy and anti-armed robbery activities, shipowners, ship operators, shipping companies, shipmasters and crews.

5 This circular revokes MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1.
ANNEX

RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS FOR PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING PIRACY1 AND ARMED ROBBERY2 AGAINST SHIPS

Piracy and armed robbery against ships

1 Before embarking on any set of measures or recommendations, it is imperative for governmental or other agencies concerned to gather accurate statistics of the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships, to collate these statistics under both type and area and to assess the nature of the attacks with special emphasis on types of attack, accurate geographical location and modus operandi of the wrongdoers and to disseminate or publish these statistics to all interested parties in a format that is understandable and usable. Advanced intelligence could also prove useful in obtaining information to Governments in order to be able to act in a coordinated manner even before an attack occurs. Based on the statistics of the incidents and any intelligence of piracy and armed robbery against ships Governments should issue to ships entitled to fly their flag, as necessary, advice and guidance on any appropriate additional precautionary measures ships may need to put in place to protect themselves from attack. Governments should involve representatives of shipowners and seafarers in developing these measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships.

2 In any ongoing campaign against piracy and armed robbery, it is necessary, wherever possible, to neutralize the activities of pirates and armed robbers. As these people are criminals under both international law and most national laws, this task will generally fall to the security forces of the States involved. Governments should avoid engaging in negotiations with these criminals and seek to bring perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery against ships to justice. Negotiating with criminals in a case regarding hijacking of a ship may encourage potential perpetrators to seek economic revenue through piracy.

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1 The following definition of piracy is contained in article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (article 101):

“Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
   (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
   (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).”

2 The Sub-regional meeting on piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea area, held in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, from 14 to 18 April 2008, agreed to modify this definition. Consistent with the ReCAAP Agreement, the “private ends” motive has been added to the definition. The formulation “within internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea” replaced “within a State’s jurisdiction”. The new formulation reflects the views of France, supported by other States participating in the meeting, that the definition for armed robbery against ships should not be applicable to acts committed seaward of the territorial sea. The new definition reads: “Armed robbery against ships” means any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.
Self protection

3 Ships can and should take measures to protect themselves from pirates and armed robbers. These measures are recommended in MSC.1/Circ.1334. While security forces can often advise on these measures, and flag States are required to take such measures as are necessary to ensure that owners and masters accept their responsibility, ultimately it is the responsibility of owners, companies, ship operators and masters to take seamanlike precautions when their ships navigate in areas where the threat of piracy and armed robbery exists. Flag States should make shipowners/companies aware of any UN Security Council, IMO, or any other UN resolutions on piracy and any recommendations therein relevant for the shipowner, ship operator, the master and crew when operating in areas where piracy or armed robbery against ships occur.

4 With respect to the carriage of firearms on board, the flag State should be aware that merchant ships and fishing vessels entering the territorial sea and/or ports of another State are subject to that State’s legislation. It should be borne in mind that importation of firearms is subject to port and coastal State regulations. It should also be borne in mind that carrying firearms may pose an even greater danger if the ship is carrying flammable cargo or similar types of dangerous goods.

Non-arming of seafarers

5 For legal and safety reasons, flag States should strongly discourage the carrying and use of firearms by seafarers for personal protection or for the protection of a ship. Seafarers are civilians and the use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ship is great. Carriage of arms on board ships may encourage attackers to carry firearms or even more dangerous weapons, thereby escalating an already dangerous situation. Any firearm on board may itself become an attractive target for an attacker.

Use of unarmed security personnel

6 The use of unarmed security personnel is a matter for individual shipowners, companies, and ship operators to decide. It should be fully acceptable to provide an enhanced lookout capability this way.

Use of privately contracted armed security personnel

7 The use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships may lead to an escalation of violence. The carriage of such personnel and their weapons is subject to flag State legislation and policies and is a matter for flag States to determine in consultation with shipowners, companies, and ship operators, if and under which conditions this will be allowed. Flag States should take into account the possible escalation of violence which could result from carriage of armed personnel on board merchant ships, when deciding on its policy.
Military teams or law enforcement officers duly authorized by Government

8 The use of military, or law enforcement officers duly authorized by the Government of the flag State to carry firearms for the security of the ship is a matter for the flag State to authorize in consultation with shipowners, companies, and ship operators. Flag States should provide clarity of their policy on the use of such teams on board vessels entitled to fly their flag.

Action plans

9 The coastal State/port State should develop action plans detailing how to prevent such an attack in the first place and actions to take in case of an attack. Coastal States should consider their obligations under SOLAS regulation XI-2/7 on Threats to ships which requires, \textit{inter alia}, where a risk of attack has been identified, the Contracting Government concerned shall advise the ships concerned and their Administrations of:

.1 the current security level;
.2 any security measures that should be put in place by the ships concerned to protect themselves from attack, in accordance with the provisions of part A of the ISPS Code; and
.3 security measures that the coastal State has decided to put in place, as appropriate.

Also, due to the possibility of collision or grounding of a ship as a result of an attack, the coastal State/port State will need to coordinate these action plans with existing plans to counter any subsequent oil spills or leakages of hazardous substances that the ship or ships may be carrying. This is especially important in areas of restricted navigation. The coastal State/port State should acquire the necessary equipment to ensure safety in waters under their jurisdiction.

10 Flag States should develop action plans detailing the response to be taken on the receipt of a report of an attack and how to assist the owners, companies\(^1\), managers and operators of a ship in case of a hijacking. A point of contact through which the ships entitled to fly their flag may request advice or assistance when sailing in waters deemed to present a heightened threat and to which such ships can report any security concerns about other ships, movements or communications in the area, should be provided.

11 All national agencies involved in preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships should take appropriate measures for the purpose of maximizing efficiency and effectiveness and, at the same time, minimizing any relevant adversity. The coastal State/port State should also establish the necessary infrastructure and operational arrangements for the purpose of preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships.

\(^1\) The term “company” is defined in SOLAS regulations IX/1 and XI-2/1.
12 States and relevant international organizations are encouraged to support capacity-building in areas or regions where piracy and armed robbery against ships is known to occur.  

13 Where ships are employed by a United Nations (UN) humanitarian programme for the delivery of humanitarian aid into areas at heightened threat, where such ships are to be escorted by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on Government service, such escorts should be implemented in conformity with international law and UN resolutions. The flag State of the ship being escorted should endeavour to conclude any necessary agreements in respect of such ships entitled to fly their flag with the State(s) providing the escorts.

14 Article 100 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requires all States to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy. In this regard, States interested in the security of maritime activities should take an active part in repression of and fight against piracy, particularly in areas where the United Nations Security Council expresses concern about the imminent threat of attacks by pirates and calls upon States to do so. This could be done by prosecuting suspected pirates, contributing to capacity building efforts and by deploying naval vessels and aircraft in accordance with international law to patrol the affected areas.

15 On communication and cooperation between various agencies, and the response time after an incident has been reported to the coastal State:

.1 an incident command system for tactical as well as operational response should be adopted in each country concerned to provide a common terminology; integrated communications; a unified command structure; consolidated action plans; a manageable span of control; designated incident facilities; and comprehensive resource management;

.2 existing mechanisms for dealing with other maritime security matters, e.g., smuggling, drug-trafficking and terrorism, should be incorporated into the incident command system in order to allow for efficient use of limited resources;

.3 procedures for rapidly relaying alerts received by communication centres to the entity responsible for action should be developed or, if existing, kept under review; and

.4 Governments should by bilateral or multilateral agreements cooperate in establishing, when appropriate, a single point of contact for ships to report piracy threats or activities in specific high threat areas.

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1 The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) undertakes capacity-building initiatives to enhance the capability of ReCAAP Contracting Parties in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is a government-to-government Agreement that addresses the incidence of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. The status of ReCAAP ISC is an IGO. Further details may be found at www.recaap.org. Similar arrangements are being developed by IMO in other regions.
16 It is imperative that all attacks, or threats of attacks, are reported immediately to the nearest RCC\(^1\) or coast radio station to alert the coastal State/port State and followed up by a more detailed written report.\(^2\) On receipt of radio reports of an attack or post attack reports, the RCC or other agency involved must take immediate action to:

.1 inform the local security authorities so that contingency plans (counter action) may be implemented;

.2 alert other ships in the area to the incident utilizing any appropriate communication means available to it, in order to create or increase their awareness; and

.3 inform the adjacent RCCs when appropriate.\(^3\)

17 The report received by maritime Administrations may be used in any diplomatic approaches made by the flag State to the Government of the coastal State in which the incident occurred. This will also provide the basis for the report to IMO.

18 Coastal States/port States should report to IMO any act of armed robbery in their waters or acts of piracy close to their waters which have been reported to them or, if such a report has not been made, where they have information of an incident because of the geographical proximity to the incident or due to the participation in the apprehension of the perpetrators. The format presently used for reports to IMO is attached at appendix 5.

19 The recording and initial examination of reports is best done, wherever possible, by a central agency possessing the necessary skills and resources. In order to maintain the required credibility, both from Government and commercial sectors, such an agency must be accurate, authoritative, efficient and impartial in both its product and its dealings with others. It is judged that the Organization best suited to this role continues to be IMO itself, although the use of IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) in Singapore, the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa or similar arrangement, as a satellite for dissemination of information should also be considered.

20 The detailed work of assessment should be carried out by the security forces of the coastal State concerned who will probably have access to further information to complete the picture and background of the attacks and those persons responsible.

21 It is important that, once the collection and collation stages have been completed, the product be distributed to all agencies requiring that information. These agencies include the Governments of coastal States for dissemination of the information, the Governments of flag States for distributing it through maritime Administrations to shipowners/company, ship operators, to other interested Government departments and other interested agencies and relevant international organizations such as ReCAAP ISC. See appendices to this circular regarding the information sharing and incident reporting process.

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\(^1\) In the Asian region, the RCCs of some ReCAAP Contracting Parties are also the ReCAAP Focal Points. The RCCs of the coastal States disseminate information of an incident internally to their respective Focal Points, maritime authorities and law enforcement agencies, as deemed appropriate. A similar system is being developed for the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean area under the Djibouti Code of Conduct.

\(^2\) Flow diagrams for reporting incidents are attached as appendices 1 and 2.

\(^3\) A template for Ships’ Message Formats is attached as appendix 4.
To encourage masters to report all incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships, coastal States/port States should make every endeavour to ensure that these masters and their ships will not be unduly delayed that the ship will not be burdened with additional costs related to such reporting, and the welfare of the crew will be taken into account.

Flag, port and coastal States are encouraged to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements\(^1\) to facilitate the investigation of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. States should cooperate to investigate fully all acts or attempted acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships entitled to fly their flag. Flag, port and coastal States are encouraged to inform other States and organizations of any relevant experience they may have obtained during the investigation, which other States may benefit from. States should implement the Code of Practice for Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, IMO resolution A.922(22) or subsequent resolutions.

On investigation into reported incidents and prosecution of pirates and armed robbers when caught:

1. it should be firmly established which entity in each country has responsibility and legal authority for carrying out post-attack investigations, since lack of clarity during the hours after an incident may result in missed investigative opportunities and loss or deterioration of evidence;

2. the appointed investigation agency should have personnel trained in standard investigative techniques and who are familiar with the legal requirements of the courts of their countries, as it is widely assumed that prosecution, conviction and confiscation of assets of offenders are the most effective means of discouraging would-be offenders;

3. as offenders may be involved in other kinds of offences, piracy and armed robbery against ships should not be viewed in isolation and useful information should, therefore, be sought in existing criminal records; and

4. systems should be in place to ensure that potentially useful information is disseminated to all appropriate parties, including investigators.

IMO regularly sends to coastal States reports of armed robbery stated to have been committed in their territorial waters, requesting information on the result of any investigations they have conducted. Coastal States are requested to respond to these inquiries even when they are unable to conduct an inquiry either because the incident was not reported or was reported too late for an investigation to be conducted. Any such responses should continue to be circulated to the sessions of the Committee.

**Criminal jurisdiction**

A person apprehended at sea outside the territorial sea of any State for committing acts of piracy or armed robbery against ships, should be prosecuted under the laws of the investigating State by mutual agreement with other substantially interested States.

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\(^1\) The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is an initiative that demonstrates a multilateral Government-to-Government agreement. Also see appendix 2 to this circular regarding the information sharing and incident reporting process in the Asian region.
Substantially interested State means a State:

.1 which is the flag State of a ship that is the subject of an investigation; or
.2 in whose territorial sea an incident has occurred; or
.3 where an incident caused, or threatened, serious harm to the environment of that State, or within those areas over which the State is entitled to exercise jurisdiction as recognized under international law; or
.4 where the consequences of an incident caused, or threatened, serious harm to that State or to artificial islands, installations or structures over which it is entitled to exercise jurisdiction; or
.5 where, as a result of an incident, nationals of that State lost their lives or received serious injuries; or
.6 that has at its disposal important information that may be of use to the investigation; or
.7 that, for some other reason, establishes an interest that is considered significant by the lead investigating State; or
.8 that was requested by another State to assist in the repression of violence against crews, passengers, ships and cargoes or the collection of evidence; or
.9 that intervened under UNCLOS article 100, exercised its right of visit, under UNCLOS article 110, or effected the seizure of a pirate/armed robber, ship or aircraft under UNCLOS article 105 or in port or on land.

27 States are recommended to take such measures as may be necessary to establish their jurisdiction over the offences of piracy and armed robbery at sea, including adjustment of their legislation, if necessary, to enable those States to apprehend and prosecute persons committing such offences.

28 For visits to ports in certain countries, ships need to carry amounts of money in cash to cover disbursements and other requirements. Cash on board a ship acts as a magnet for attackers. Where the carriage of large sums of cash is necessary because of exchange control restrictions in some States, these States are urged to take a more flexible approach.

29 Flag States should require all ships operating in waters where attacks occur to have measures to prevent attacks and attempted attacks of piracy and armed robbery against ships and on how to act if such an attack or attempted attack occurs, as part of the emergency response procedures in the safety management system, or part of the ship security plan. Such measures should include a full spectrum of appropriate passive and active security measures. The ship security plan and emergency response plans should be based on a risk assessment which take into account the basic parameters of the operation including:

.1 the risks that may be faced;
.2 the ship’s actual size, freeboard, maximum speed and the type of cargo, which is being transported;
.3 the number of crew members available, their capability and training;
.4 the ability to establish secure areas on board ship; and
.5 the equipment on board, including any surveillance and detection equipment that has been provided.

Ships not covered by the ISM Code or the ISPS Code should be required to take similar precautionary measures.

30 Bearing in mind that ships already have in their procedures the ability to take preventive measures, Governments should use caution when considering the use of security levels 1, 2 and 3 in the ISPS Code for piracy and armed robbery situations.

31 If at all possible, ships should be routed away from areas where attacks are known to have taken place and, in particular, seek to avoid bottlenecks. If ships are approaching ports where attacks have taken place on ships at anchor, rather than on ships underway, and it is known that the ship will have to anchor off port for some time, consideration should be given to delaying anchoring by slow steaming or longer routeing to remain well off shore thereby reducing the period during which the ship will be at risk. Such action should not affect the ship's berthing priority. Charter party agreements should recognize that ships may need to deviate away from areas where attacks occur and that ships may need to delay arrival at such ports, either when no berth is available for the ship, or offshore loading or unloading will be delayed for a protracted period.

32 Coastal States situated in areas affected by piracy and armed robbery

.1 in order to be able to respond, as quickly as possible, to any report from ships on piracy and armed robbery attacks, every piracy or armed robbery threat area should be adequately covered by Coast Earth Stations which are continuously operational, and which preferably are situated in the littoral State responsible for the area or in neighbouring States;

.2 neighbouring countries having common borders in areas which can be characterized as piracy and armed robbery threat areas should establish cooperation agreements with respect to preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery. Such agreements should include the coordination of patrol activities in such areas. An example of a model agreement is attached as appendix 6;

.3 on further development of regional cooperation, a regional agreement to facilitate coordinated response at the tactical as well as the operational level should be concluded between the countries concerned:

.3.1 such an agreement should specify how information would be disseminated; establish joint command and control procedures (a regional incident command system); ensure efficient communications; set policies for joint operations and entry and pursuit; establish the links between entities involved in all maritime security matters; establish joint specialized training of and the exchange of views between investigators; and establish joint exercises between tactical and operational entities; and

1 Examples of such agreements include the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), details of which may be found at www.recaap.org; the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Regional Integrated Coast Guard Network in West and Central Africa; and the Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (the Djibouti Code of Conduct).
.3.2 that existing agreements, bilateral or regional, be reviewed, if necessary, to allow for the extension of entry and pursuit into the territorial sea of the State(s) with which the agreement has been made and practical operational procedures which will ensure the granting of permission to extend pursuit into another jurisdiction being received by the pursuing vessel at very short notice;

.4 as piracy and armed robbery against ships is not only a regional but a global problem, the established regional cooperation forums should ensure cooperation amongst themselves and the IMO in order to draw on the different experiences gained;

.5 every country is recommended to ensure that each national RCC, which may be contacted by RCCs from other countries, is capable at all times of communicating in English. Thus, at least one person with a satisfactory knowledge of the English language – both written and spoken – should always be on duty;

.6 in order to minimize coordination problems and possible delays in cases when distress/safety messages related to a specific area are received by Coast Earth Stations and RCCs in other countries, it is recommended to arrange common meetings/seminars for key personnel from both areas for the exchange of views and to establish suitable procedures and actions in different types of situations. Consideration should also be given to arranging common exercises to verify that procedures and actions are effective;

.7 if an attack is reported in an area covered by NAVTEX transmissions, a piracy/armed robbery attack warning with category “Important” or “Vital”, as appropriate, should be transmitted whenever such warnings can be transmitted sufficiently early to enable ships to take precautions appropriate to preventing attacks. If an attack is reported in an area which is not covered by NAVTEX transmissions, a piracy/armed robbery attack warning should be transmitted as an EGC SafetyNET message through the INMARSAT system. In this respect, relevant authorities are recommended to make arrangements with one or more Coast Earth Station(s) covering relevant areas, so as to be registered as “information providers”;

and

.8 those countries that have established, or which plan to establish, radar surveillance systems, are recommended to investigate the potential suitability of such facilities for anti-piracy/armed robbery purposes. If such facilities are judged to be suitable for such purposes, the facilities and procedures necessary for their rapid and efficient use should be established.

33 Governments should coordinate with the shipowner or the company and the coastal State when receiving a ship security alert. It is important that any response to an incident is well planned and executed, and emphasizes the safety of the crew. Those involved should be as familiar as possible with a ship environment. Therefore, those responsible for responding to acts of piracy or armed robbery of ships, whether at sea or in port, should be trained in the general layout and features of the types of ship most likely to be encountered. Shipowners should be encouraged to cooperate with the security forces by providing access to their ships for the necessary familiarization.
34 Coastal States should consider the use of suitably equipped helicopters and other suitable means in countering acts of piracy and armed robbery. Security forces should consider the use of modern night vision equipment and other applicable modern technology.

35 A local rule of the road amendment allowing ships under attack to flash or occult their “not under command” lights should be authorized in areas where pirate/armed robbery attacks are more common.

36 States with adjacent coastal waters affected by pirates and armed robbers should develop or maintain coordinated patrols by both ships and aircraft.

37 Security forces and Governments should maintain close liaison with their counterparts in neighbouring States to facilitate the apprehension and prosecution of criminals involved in such unlawful acts. Some countries have already a well established coordination which is also used for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery.

38 RCC personnel should be instructed on the most efficient means of communicating reports on piracy and armed robbery, which they receive. Depending on the circumstances, this may require forwarding the reports to another RCC or coast radio station, notifying security forces or patrol craft in the area and taking steps to have a broadcast warning issued or other suitable action taken.

39 RCCs should be encouraged to forward all received reports of piracy and armed robbery to IMO. States are encouraged to share any information with IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre and the ReCAAP Focal Points.
APPENDIX 1

Flow diagram for attacks in coastal waters

Notes:
- Radio/GMDSS
- Fastest means, not radio
- Follow-up by letter, fax, email or telex
APPENDIX 2

Flow diagram for reporting incidents in Asia

Legend:
- Radio/GMDSS
- Fastest means
- Follow-up comms

Notes:
1. In the Asian region, the RCCs of some ReCAAP Contracting Parties are also their ReCAAP Focal Points (FPs). These Focal Points also disseminate incident information internally to their respective RCCs, maritime authorities and law enforcement agencies as appropriate.
2. Coastal States (in the context of this addendum) refer only to those who are Contracting Parties to the ReCAAP.
3. The incident reporting process in Asia does not change other reporting processes for incidents already in practice.
## APPENDIX 3

### “PHASES” RELATED TO VOYAGES IN PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY THREAT AREAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase Symbol</th>
<th>Phase Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Approaching a piracy/armed robbery threat area (1 hour prior to entering)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Entering a piracy/armed robbery threat area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Inside a piracy/armed robbery threat area, but no suspect piracy/armed robbery vessel detected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Inside a piracy/armed robbery threat area: suspect piracy/armed robbery vessel detected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Certainty that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Pirate/armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Pirates/armed robbers start attempts to enter ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Pirates/armed robbers have one or more of the ship’s personnel in their control/custody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>The pirates/armed robbers have gained access to the bridge or the master’s office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>The pirates/armed robbers have stolen property/money, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>The pirates/armed robbers start to disembark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>The pirates/armed robbers have disembarked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>The pirate/armed robbery vessel is no longer in contact with the ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Own ship leaves the piracy/armed robbery threat area</td>
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APPENDIX 4

SHIPS’ MESSAGE FORMATS

Report 1 – Initial message – Piracy/armed robbery attack alert

1 Ship’s name and, call sign, IMO number, INMARSAT IDs (plus ocean region code) and MMSI
   MAYDAY/DISTRESS ALERT (see note)
   URGENCY SIGNAL
   PIRACY/ARMED ROBBERY ATTACK

2 Ship’s position (and time of position UTC)
   Latitude   Longitude
   Course Speed   KTS

3 Nature of event

Note: It is expected that this message will be a distress message because the ship or persons will be in grave or imminent danger when under attack. Where this is not the case, the word MAYDAY/DISTRESS ALERT is to be omitted. Use of distress priority (3) in the INMARSAT system will not require MAYDAY/DISTRESS ALERT to be included.

Report 2 – Follow-up report – Piracy/armed robbery attack alert

1 Ship’s name and, callsign, IMO number

2 Reference initial PIRACY/ARMED ROBBERY ALERT

3 Position of incident
   Latitude   Longitude
   Name of the area

4 Details of incident, e.g.:
   While sailing, at anchor or at berth?
   Method of attack
   Description/number of suspect craft
   Number and brief description of pirates/robbers
   What kind of weapons did the pirates/robbers carry?
   Any other information (e.g., language spoken)
   Injuries to crew and passengers
   Damage to ship (Which part of the ship was attacked?)
   Brief details of stolen property/cargo
   Action taken by the master and crew
   Was incident reported to the coastal authority and to whom?
   Action taken by the Coastal State
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN TO PREVENT ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY

5 Last observed movements of pirate/suspect craft, e.g.:
   Date/time/course/position/speed

6 Assistance required

7 Preferred communications with reporting ship, e.g.:
   Appropriate Coast Radio Station
   HF/MF/VHF
   INMARSAT IDs (plus ocean region code)
   MMSI

8 Date/time of report (UTC)
APPENDIX 5

FORMAT FOR REPORTING TO IMO THROUGH MARITIME ADMINISTRATIONS OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Ship's name and IMO number
   - Type of ship
   - Flag
   - Gross tonnage

2. Date and time

3. Latitude   Longitude
   - Name of the area
   - While sailing, at anchor or at berth?

4. Method of attack
   - Description/number of suspect craft
   - Number and brief description of pirates/robbers
   - What kind of weapons did the pirates/robbers carry?
   - Any other information (e.g., language spoken)

5. Injuries to crew and passengers
   - Damage to ship (Which part of the ship was attacked?)
   - Brief details of stolen property/cargo

6. Action taken by the master and crew

7. Was incident reported to the coastal authority and to whom?

8. Reporting State or international organization

9. Action taken by the coastal State

---

1 Corresponding to the column numbers in the annex to the IMO monthly circulars.
2 The following definition of piracy is contained in article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

   "Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
   (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
      (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
      (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
   (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
   (c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b)."
APPENDIX 6

DRAFT¹ REGIONAL AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS

Note: Due to different circumstances among States, this example agreement may be varied to meet specific situations.

Agreement between the Governments of ____________, ____________,
______________, ____________, and ____________

(Hereinafter, “the Parties”);

Bearing in mind the complex nature of the problem of piracy and armed robbery against ships;

Having regard to the urgent need for international cooperation in preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships;

Desiring to promote greater cooperation between the parties and thereby enhance their effectiveness in preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships;

Being conscious of the fact that, in order to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships effectively and efficiently, the active participation of all States affected is needed;

Taking into account that the Governments do not have sufficient technical and material resources to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships independently;

Recognizing that piracy and armed robbery are international and transnational threats to seafarers, property and the environment; and conscious of the fact that the Parties are experiencing increased incidents of piracy and armed robbery within their maritime zones and adjoining international waters;

Have agreed as follows:

Definitions

For the purpose of this Agreement, unless expressly provided otherwise:


2 “Armed robbery against ships” means [...].

¹ The present draft includes text in square brackets which was left to the discretion of the individual Governments.

Note: Attention should also be given to existing regional agreements such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the ReCAAP, and the IMO/MOWCA Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Regional Integrated Coast Guard Network in West and Central Africa.
3 “National waters [and airspace]” means the territorial sea and internal waters of the Parties [and the air space over those States].

4 “Law enforcement vessels” mean ships of the Parties clearly marked and identifiable as being on government non-commercial service and authorized to that effect, including any boat and aircraft embarked on such ships, aboard which law enforcement officials are embarked.

[5 “Law enforcement aircraft” means aircraft of the Parties engaged in law enforcement operations or operations in support of law enforcement activities clearly marked and identifiable as being on non-commercial government service and authorized to that effect.]

5[6] “Liaison officer” means one or more law enforcement officials, including boarding teams, of one Party authorized to embark on a law enforcement vessel of another Party.

6[7] “Suspect vessel” means a vessel used for commercial or private purposes in respect of which there are reasonable grounds to suspect it is involved in piracy or armed robbery against ships.

7[8] “Incident Command System” means a regional system for operational/tactical response to acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships providing common terminology, modular organization, integrated communications, unified command structure, consolidated action plans, manageable span of control, designated incident facilities and comprehensive resource management.

Nature and scope of the Agreement

1 The Parties shall cooperate in preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea to the fullest extent possible, consistent with available law enforcement resources and related priorities.

2 The Parties undertake to agree on procedures for improving intelligence sharing.

Operations in [and over] national waters

Operations to suppress piracy and armed robbery in the national waters of a Party are subject to the authority of that Party.

Programme for law enforcement officials aboard another Party’s vessels

1 The Parties shall establish a law enforcement liaison officer programme among their law enforcement authorities. Each Party may designate a coordinator to organize its programme activities and to notify the other Parties of the types of vessels and officials involved in the programme.

2 The Parties may designate qualified law enforcement officials to act as law enforcement liaison officers.
3 Subject to the law of the Parties involved, these liaison officers may, in appropriate circumstances:

.1 embark on the law enforcement vessels of other Parties;
.2 authorize the pursuit, by the law enforcement vessels on which they are embarked, of suspect vessels fleeing into the territorial waters of the liaison officer's Party;
.3 authorize the law enforcement vessels on which they are embarked to conduct patrols to suppress acts of armed robbery against ships in the liaison officer's Party's national waters; and
.4 enforce the laws of the Parties in national waters, or seaward there from in the exercise of the right of hot pursuit or otherwise in accordance with international law.

4 When a liaison officer is embarked on another Party's vessel, and the enforcement action being carried out is pursuant to the liaison officer's authority, any search or seizure of property, any detention of a person, and any use of force pursuant to this Agreement, whether or not involving weapons, shall be carried out by the liaison officer, except as follows:

.1 crew members of the other Party's vessel may assist in any such action if expressly requested to do so by the liaison officer and only to the extent and in the manner requested. Such request may only be made, agreed to, and acted upon in accordance with the applicable laws and policies; and
.2 such crew members may use force in self-defence, in accordance with the applicable laws and policies.

5 Parties may only conduct operations to suppress piracy and armed robbery in the waters of another Party with the permission of that Party in any of the following circumstances:

.1 an embarked liaison officer so authorizes;
.2 on those exceptional occasions when a suspect vessel, detected seaward of national waters, enters the national waters of another Party and no liaison officer is embarked in a law enforcement vessel, and no law enforcement vessel from the Party whose national waters have been entered by a suspect vessel is immediately available to investigate, the law enforcement vessel may follow the suspect vessel into national waters, in order to board the suspect vessel and secure the scene, while awaiting expeditious instructions and the arrival from law enforcement authorities of the Party in whose national waters the event took place;
.3 on those equally exceptional occasions when a suspect vessel is detected within a Party's national waters, and no liaison officer is embarked from that Party and no law enforcement vessel is immediately available to investigate from that Party, the law enforcement vessel from another Party may enter the national waters, in order to board the suspect vessel and secure the scene, while awaiting expeditious instructions from the law enforcement authorities and the arrival of law enforcement officials of the Party in whose national waters the event has occurred; and
.4 Parties shall provide prior notice to the law enforcement authority of the Party in whose national waters the event took place of action to be taken under subparagraphs .2 and.3 of this paragraph, unless it is not operationally feasible
to do so. In any case, notice of the action shall be provided to the relevant law enforcement authority without delay.

[6] When aircraft of the Parties (hereafter referred to as “aircraft”) are operating to suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships or supporting such operations, other Parties shall permit those aircraft:

.1 to overfly the territory and waters of other Parties with due regard for the laws and regulations of those Parties for the flight and manoeuvre of aircraft, subject to paragraph 7 of this section; and

.2 to land and remain in national airports, after receiving authorization from the minister of public security, on the occasions and for the time necessary for the proper conduct of operations deemed necessary under this Agreement.

7 The Parties shall, in the interest of flight safety, observe the following procedures for facilitating flights within the national airspace by law enforcement aircraft:

.1 in the event of planned law enforcement operations, Parties shall provide reasonable notice and communication frequencies to the appropriate aviation authorities responsible for air traffic control of planned flights by its aircraft over national territory or waters;

.2 in the event of unplanned operations, the Parties shall exchange information concerning the appropriate communication frequencies and other information pertinent to flight safety; and

.3 any aircraft engaged in law enforcement operations or operations in support of law enforcement activities in accordance with this agreement shall comply with such air navigation and flight safety directions as may be required by pertinent aviation authorities, and with any written operating procedures developed for flight operations within their airspace under this Agreement.]

Operations seaward of the territorial sea

1 Whenever law enforcement officials of a Party encounter a suspect vessel flying the flag of another Party or claiming to be registered in the country of another Party, located seaward of any State’s territorial sea, this Agreement constitutes the authorization of that Party for the boarding and search of the suspect vessel and the persons found on board by such officials. If evidence of piracy or armed robbery against ships is found, law enforcement officials may detrain the vessel and persons on board pending expeditious disposition instructions from the Government of the flag State.

2 Except as expressly provided herein, this Agreement does not apply to or limit boardings of vessels seaward of any State’s territorial sea, conducted by either Party in accordance with international law, whether based, inter alia, on the right of visit, the rendering of assistance to persons, ships, and property in distress or peril, the consent of the shipmaster, or an authorization from the flag State to take law enforcement action.
Jurisdiction over detained vessel

1 In all cases arising in national waters, or concerning vessels flying the flag of a Party seaward of any State’s territorial sea, the Party whose flag is being flown by the suspect vessel shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a detained vessel, cargo and/or persons on board (including seizure, forfeiture, arrest, and prosecution), provided, however, that the Party may, subject to its constitution and laws, waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction and authorize the enforcement of another Party’s law against the vessel, cargo and/or persons on board.

2 Instructions as to the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be given without delay.

Implementation

1 Operations to suppress piracy and armed robbery pursuant to this Agreement shall be carried out only against suspect vessels, including vessels without nationality, and vessels assimilated to vessels without nationality.

2 All Parties shall utilize the Incident Command System when operating in conjunction with another Party in an operation within the scope of this Agreement.

3 All Parties undertake to agree on uniform reporting criteria in order to ensure that an accurate assessment of the threat is developed. Furthermore, all Parties shall endeavour to ensure that reporting ships are not unduly detained for investigative purposes. A summary of reports to each Party shall be shared at least annually with the other Parties.

4 A Party conducting a boarding and search pursuant to this Agreement shall promptly notify the flag State of the results thereof. The relevant Party shall timely report to the other Party, consistent with its laws, on the status of all investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings resulting from enforcement action taken pursuant to this Agreement where evidence of piracy and armed robbery has been found.

5 Each Party shall ensure that its law enforcement officials, when conducting boardings and searches [and air interception] activities pursuant to this Agreement, act in accordance with the applicable national laws and policies of that Party and with the applicable international law and accepted international practices.

6 Boardings and searches pursuant to this Agreement shall be carried out by law enforcement officials from law enforcement vessels [or aircraft]. The boarding and search teams may operate from such ships [and aircraft] of the relevant Parties, and seaward of the territorial sea of any State, from such ships of other Parties as may be agreed upon by the Parties. The boarding and search team may carry standard law enforcement small arms.

[7 While conducting air intercept activities pursuant to this Agreement, the Parties shall not endanger the lives of persons on board and the safety of civil aircraft.]

7[8] All use of force pursuant to this Agreement shall be in strict accordance with the applicable laws and policies and shall in all cases be the minimum reasonably necessary
under the circumstances. Nothing in this Agreement shall impair the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence by law enforcement or other officials of either Party.

8[9] When carrying out operations pursuant to this Agreement, the Parties shall take due account of the possible advantage of conducting boarding and search operations in safer conditions at the closest port of a Party to minimize any prejudice to the legitimate commercial activities of the suspect vessel, or its flag State or any other interested State; the need not to delay unduly the suspect vessel; the need not to endanger the safety of life at sea without endangering the safety of the law enforcement officials or their vessels [or aircraft]; and the need not to endanger the security of the suspect vessel or its cargo.

9[10] To facilitate implementation of this Agreement, each Party shall ensure the Parties are fully informed of its respective applicable laws and policies, particularly those pertaining to the use of force. Each Party shall ensure that all of its law enforcement officials are knowledgeable concerning the applicable laws and policies of the other Parties.

10[11] Assets seized in consequence of any operation undertaken in the national waters of a Party pursuant to this Agreement shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws of the Party. Assets seized in consequence of any operation undertaken seaward of the territorial sea of a Party pursuant to this Agreement shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws of the seizing Party. To the extent permitted by its laws and upon such terms as it deems appropriate, a Party may, in any case, transfer forfeited assets or proceeds of their sale to another Party. Each transfer generally will reflect the contribution of other Parties to facilitating or effecting the forfeiture of such assets or proceeds.

11[12] The law enforcement authority of one Party (the “first Party”) may request, and the law enforcement authority of another Party may authorize, law enforcement officials of the other Party to provide technical assistance to law enforcement officials of the first Party in their boarding and investigation of suspect vessels located in the territory or waters of the first Party.

12[13] Any injury to or loss of life of a law enforcement official of a Party shall normally be remedied in accordance with the laws of that Party. Any other claim submitted for damage, injury, death or loss resulting from an operation carried out under this Agreement shall be processed, considered, and if merited, resolved in favour of the claimant by the Party whose officials conducted the operation, in accordance with the domestic law of that Party, and in a manner consistent with international law. If any loss, injury or death is suffered as a result of any action taken by the law enforcement or other officials of one Party in contravention of this Agreement, or any improper or unreasonable action is taken by a Party pursuant thereto, the relevant Parties shall, without prejudice to any other legal rights which may be available, consult at the request of a Party to resolve the matter and decide any questions relating to compensation.

13[14] Disputes arising from the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement shall be settled by mutual agreement of the Parties.

14[15] The Parties agree to consult, on at least an annual basis, to evaluate the implementation of this Agreement and to consider enhancing its effectiveness, including the preparation of amendments to this Agreement that take into account increased operational capacity of the law enforcement authorities and officials. In case a difficulty arises concerning the operation
of this Agreement, any Party may request consultations with another Party to resolve the matter.

15[16] Nothing in this Agreement is intended to alter the rights and privileges due any individual in any legal proceeding.

16[17] Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the position of any Party with regard to the international law of the sea.

Entry into force and duration

1 [Entry into force]

2 [Denunciation]

3 This Agreement shall continue to apply after termination with respect to any administrative or judicial proceedings arising out of actions taken pursuant to this Agreement during the time that it was in force.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

Done at , this day of
Guidance on the Implementation of Model Courses
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Part 1: Preparation

1. Introduction

1.1 The success of any enterprise depends heavily on sound and effective preparations.

1.2 Although the IMO model course “package” has been made as comprehensive as possible, it is nonetheless vital that sufficient time and resources are devoted to preparation. Preparation not only involves matters concerning administration or organization, but also includes the preparation of any course notes, drawings, sketches, overhead transparencies, etc., which may be necessary.

2. General considerations

2.1 The course “package” should be studied carefully; in particular, the course syllabus and associated material must be attentively and thoroughly studied. This is vital if a clear understanding is to be obtained of what is required, in terms of resources necessary to successfully implement the course.

2.2 A “checklist”, such as that set out in annex A1, should be used throughout all stages of preparation to ensure that all necessary actions and activities are being carried out in good time and in an effective manner. The checklist allows the status of the preparation procedures to be monitored, and helps in identifying the remedial actions necessary to meet deadlines. It will be necessary to hold meetings of all those concerned in presenting the course from time to time in order to assess the status of the preparation and “troubleshoot” any difficulties.

2.3 The course syllabus should be discussed with the teaching staff who are to present the course, and their views received on the particular parts they are to present. A study of the syllabus will determine whether the incoming trainees need preparatory work to meet the entry standard. The detailed teaching syllabus is constructed in “training outcome” format. Each specific outcome states precisely what the trainee must do to show that the outcome has been achieved. An example of a model course syllabus is given in annex A2. Part 3 deals with curriculum development and explains how a syllabus is constructed and used.

2.4 The teaching staff who are to present the course should construct notes or lesson plans to achieve these outcomes. A sample lesson plan for one of the areas of the sample syllabus is provided in annex A3.

2.5 It is important that the staff who present the course convey, to the person in charge of the course, their assessment of the course as it progresses.

3. Specific considerations

3.1 Scope of course

In reviewing the scope of the course, the instructor should determine whether it needs any adjustment in order to meet additional local or national requirements (see Part 3).
3.2 Course objective
   .1 The course objective, as stated in the course material, should be very carefully considered so that its meaning is fully understood. Does the course objective require expansion to encompass any additional task that national or local requirements will impose upon those who successfully complete the course? Conversely, are there elements included which are not validated by national industry requirements?

   .2 It is important that any subsequent assessment made of the course should include a review of the course objectives.

3.3 Entry standards
   .1 If the entry standard will not be met by your intended trainee intake, those entering the course should first be required to complete an upgrading course to raise them to the stated entry level. Alternatively, those parts of the course affected could be augmented by inserting course material which will cover the knowledge required.

   .2 If the entry standard will be exceeded by your planned trainee intake, you may wish to abridge or omit those parts of the course the teaching of which would be unnecessary, or which could be dealt with as revision.

   .3 Study the course material with the above questions in mind and with a view to assessing whether or not it will be necessary for the trainees to carry out preparatory work prior to joining the course. Preparatory material for the trainees can range from refresher notes, selected topics from textbooks and reading of selected technical papers, through to formal courses of instruction. It may be necessary to use a combination of preparatory work and the model course material in modified form. It must be emphasized that where the model course material involves an international requirement, such as a regulation of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) 1978, as amended, the standard must not be relaxed; in many instances, the intention of the Convention is to require review, revision or increased depth of knowledge by candidates undergoing training for higher certificates.

3.4 Course certificate, diploma or document
   Where a certificate, diploma or document is to be issued to trainees who successfully complete the course, ensure that this is available and properly worded and that the industry and all authorities concerned are fully aware of its purpose and intent.

3.5 Course intake limitations
   .1 The course designers have recommended limitations regarding the numbers of trainees who may participate in the course. As far as possible, these limitations should not be exceeded; otherwise, the quality of the course will be diluted.

   .2 It may be necessary to make arrangements for accommodating the trainees and providing facilities for food and transportation. These aspects must be considered at an early stage of the preparations.
3.6 Staff requirements
.1 It is important that an experienced person, preferably someone with experience in course and curriculum development, is given the responsibility of implementing the course.

.2 Such a person is often termed a “course co-ordinator” or “course director”. Other staff, such as lecturers, instructors, laboratory technicians, workshop instructors, etc., will be needed to implement the course effectively. Staff involved in presenting the course will need to be properly briefed about the course work they will be dealing with, and a system must be set up for checking the material they may be required to prepare. To do this, it will be essential to make a thorough study of the syllabus and apportion the parts of the course work according to the abilities of the staff called upon to present the work.

.3 The person responsible for implementing the course should consider monitoring the quality of teaching in such areas as variety and form of approach, relationship with trainees, and communicative and interactive skills; where necessary, this person should also provide appropriate counselling and support.

3.7 Teaching facilities and equipment
.1 Rooms and other services
It is important to make reservations as soon as is practicable for the use of lecture rooms, laboratories, workshops and other spaces.

.2 Equipment
Arrangements must be made at an early stage for the use of equipment needed in the spaces mentioned in 3.7.1 to support and carry through the work of the course. For example:

- blackboards and writing materials
- apparatus in laboratories for any associated demonstrations and experiments
- machinery and related equipment in workshops
- equipment and materials in other spaces (e.g. for demonstrating fire fighting, personal survival, etc.)

3.8 Teaching aids
Any training aids specified as being essential to the course should be constructed, or checked for availability and working order.

3.9 Audio-visual aids
Audio-visual aids (AVA) may be recommended in order to reinforce the learning process in some parts of the course. Such recommendations will be identified in Part A of the model course. The following points should be borne in mind:

.1 Overhead projectors
Check through any illustrations provided in the course for producing overhead projector (OHP) transparencies, and arrange them in order of presentation. To produce transparencies, a supply of transparency sheets is required; the illustration scan be
transferred to these via photocopying. Alternatively, transparencies can be produced by writing or drawing on the sheet. Coloured pens are useful for emphasizing salient points. Ensure that spare projector lamps (bulbs) are available.

.2 Slide projectors
If you order slides indicated in the course framework, check through them and arrange them in order of presentation. Slides are usually produced from photographic negatives. If further slides are considered necessary and cannot be produced locally, OHP transparencies should be resorted to.

.3 Cine projector
If films are to be used, check their compatibility with the projector (i.e. 16 mm, 35 mm, sound, etc.). The films must be test-run to ensure there are no breakages.

.4 Video equipment
It is essential to check the type of video tape to be used. The two types commonly used are VHS and Betamax. Although special machines exist which can play either format, the majority of machines play only one or the other type. Note that VHS and Betamax are not compatible; the correct machine type is required to match the tape. Check also that the TV raster format used in the tapes (i.e. number of lines, frames/second, scanning order, etc.) is appropriate to the TV equipment available. (Specialist advice may have to be sought on this aspect.) All video tapes should be test-run prior to their use on the course.

.5 Computer equipment
If computer-based aids are used, check their compatibility with the projector and the available software.

.6 General note
The electricity supply must be checked for correct voltage, and every precaution must be taken to ensure that the equipment operates properly and safely. It is important to use a proper screen which is correctly positioned; it may be necessary to exclude daylight in some cases. A check must be made to ensure that appropriate screens or blinds are available. All material to be presented should be test-run to eliminate any possible troubles, arranged in the correct sequence in which it is to be shown, and properly identified and cross-referenced in the course timetable and lesson plans.

3.10 IMO references
The content of the course, and therefore its standard, reflects the requirements of all the relevant IMO international conventions and the provisions of other instruments as indicated in the model course. The relevant publications can be obtained from the Publication Service of IMO, and should be available, at least to those involved in presenting the course, if the indicated extracts are not included in a compendium supplied with the course.

3.11 Textbooks
The detailed syllabus may refer to a particular textbook or textbooks. It is essential that these books are available to each student taking the course. If supplies of
textbooks are limited, a copy should be loaned to each student, who will return it at the end of the course. Again, some courses are provided with a compendium which includes all or part of the training material required to support the course.

3.12 Bibliography
Any useful supplementary source material is identified by the course designers and listed in the model course. This list should be supplied to the participants so that they are aware where additional information can be obtained, and at least two copies of each book or publication should be available for reference in the training institute library.

3.13 Timetable
If a timetable is provided in a model course, it is for guidance only. It may only take one or two presentations of the course to achieve an optimal timetable. However, even then it must be borne in mind that any timetable is subject to variation, depending on the general needs of the trainees in any one class and the availability of instructors and equipment.
Part 2: Notes on teaching technique

1. Preparation

1.1 Identify the section of the syllabus which is to be dealt with.
1.2 Read and study thoroughly all the syllabus elements.
1.3 Obtain the necessary textbooks or reference papers which cover the training area to be presented.
1.4 Identify the equipment which will be needed, together with support staff necessary for its operation.
1.5 It is essential to use a “lesson plan”, which can provide a simplified format for coordinating lecture notes and supporting activities. The lesson plan breaks the material down into identifiable steps, making use of brief statements, possibly with keywords added, and indicating suitable allocations of time for each step. The use of audio-visual material should be indexed at the correct point in the lecture with an appropriate allowance of time. The audio-visual material should be test-run prior to its being used in the lecture. An example of a lesson plan is shown in annex A3.
1.6 The syllabus is structured in training outcome format and it is thereby relatively straightforward to assess each trainee’s grasp of the subject matter presented during the lecture. Such assessment may take the form of further discussion, oral questions, written tests or selection-type tests, such as multiple-choice questions, based on the objectives used in the syllabus. Selection-type tests and short-answer tests can provide an objective assessment independent of any bias on the part of the assessor. For certification purposes, assessors should be appropriately qualified for the particular type of training or assessment.

REMEMBER – POOR PREPARATION IS A SURE WAY TO LOSE THE INTEREST OF A GROUP

1.7 Check the rooms to be used before the lecture is delivered. Make sure that all the equipment and apparatus are ready for use and that any support staff are also prepared and ready. In particular, check that all blackboards are clean and that a supply of writing and cleaning materials is readily available.

2. Delivery

2.1 Always face the people you are talking to; never talk with your back to the group.
2.2 Talk clearly and sufficiently loudly to reach everyone.
2.3 Maintain eye contact with the whole group as a way of securing their interest and maintaining it (i.e. do not look continuously at one particular person, nor at a point in space).
2.4 People are all different, and they behave and react in different ways. An important function of a lecturer is to maintain interest and interaction between members of a group.

2.5 Some points or statements are more important than others and should therefore be emphasized. To ensure that such points or statements are remembered, they must be restated a number of times, preferably in different words.

2.6 If a blackboard is to be used, any writing on it must be clear and large enough for everyone to see. Use colour to emphasize important points, particularly in sketches.

2.7 It is only possible to maintain a high level of interest for a relatively short period of time; therefore, break the lecture up into different periods of activity to keep interest at its highest level. Speaking, writing, sketching, use of audio-visual material, questions, and discussions can all be used to accomplish this. When a group is writing or sketching, walk amongst the group, looking at their work, and provide comment or advice to individual members of the group when necessary.

2.8 When holding a discussion, do not allow individual members of the group to monopolize the activity, but ensure that all members have a chance to express opinions or ideas.

2.9 If addressing questions to a group, do not ask them collectively; otherwise, the same person may reply each time. Instead, address the questions to individuals in turn, so that everyone is invited to participate.

2.10 It is important to be guided by the syllabus content and not to be tempted to introduce material which may be too advanced, or may contribute little to the course objective. There is often competition between instructors to achieve a level which is too advanced. Also, instructors often strongly resist attempts to reduce the level to that required by a syllabus.

2.11 Finally, effective preparation makes a major contribution to the success of a lecture. Things often go wrong; preparedness and good planning will contribute to putting things right. Poor teaching cannot be improved by good accommodation or advanced equipment, but good teaching can overcome any disadvantages that poor accommodation and lack of equipment can present.
Part 3: Curriculum development

1. **Curriculum**
The dictionary defines *curriculum* as a “regular course of study”, while *syllabus* is defined as “a concise statement of the subjects forming a course of study”. Thus, in general terms, a curriculum is simply a course, while a syllabus can be thought of as a list (traditionally, a “list of things to be taught”).

2. **Course content**
The subjects which are needed to form a training course, and the precise skills and depth of knowledge required in the various subjects, can only be determined through an in-depth assessment of the job functions which the course participants are to be trained to perform (job analysis). This analysis determines the training needs, hence the purpose of the course (course objective). After ascertaining this, it is possible to define the scope of the course.

(Note: Determination of whether or not the course objective has been achieved may quite possibly entail assessment, over a period of time, of the “on-the-job performance” of those completing the course. However, the detailed learning objectives are quite specific and immediately assessable.)

3. **Job analysis**
A job analysis can only be properly carried out by a group whose members are representative of the organizations and bodies involved in the area of work to be covered by the course. The validation of results, via review with persons currently employed in the job concerned, is essential if undertraining and overtraining are to be avoided.

4. **Course plan**
Following definition of the course objective and scope, a course plan or outline can be drawn up. The potential students for the course (the trainee target group) must then be identified, the entry standard to the course decided and the prerequisites defined.

5. **Syllabus**
The final step in the process is the preparation of the detailed syllabus with associated timescales; the identification of those parts of textbooks and technical papers which cover the training areas to a sufficient degree to meet, but not exceed, each learning objective; and the drawing up of a bibliography of additional material for supplementary reading.

6. **Syllabus content**
The material contained in a syllabus is not static; technology is continuously undergoing change and there must therefore be a means for reviewing course material in order to eliminate what is redundant and introduce new material reflecting current practice. As defined above, a syllabus can be thought of as a list and, traditionally, there have always been an “examination syllabus” and a “teaching
syllabus”; these indicate, respectively, the subject matter contained in an examination paper, and the subject matter a teacher is to use in preparing lessons or lectures.

7. Training outcomes

7.1 The prime communication difficulty presented by any syllabus is how to convey the “depth” of knowledge required. A syllabus is usually constructed as a series of “training outcomes” to help resolve this difficulty.

7.2 Thus, curriculum development makes use of training outcomes to ensure that a common minimum level and breadth of attainment is achieved by all the trainees following the same course, irrespective of the training institution (i.e. teaching/lecturing staff).

7.3 Training outcomes are trainee-oriented, in that they describe an end result which is to be achieved by the trainee as a result of a learning process.

7.4 In many cases, the learning process is linked to a skill or work activity and, to demonstrate properly the attainment of the objective, the trainee response may have to be based on practical application or use, or on work experience.

7.5 The training outcome, although aimed principally at the trainee to ensure achievement of a specific learning step, also provides a framework for the teacher or lecturer upon which lessons or lectures can be constructed.

7.6 A training outcome is specific and describes precisely what a trainee must do to demonstrate his knowledge, understanding or skill as an end product of a learning process.

7.7 The learning process is the “knowledge acquisition” or “skill development” that takes place during a course. The outcome of the process is an acquired “knowledge”, “understanding”, “skill”; but these terms alone are not sufficiently precise for describing a training outcome.

7.8 Verbs, such as “calculates”, “defines”, “explains”, “lists”, “solves” and “states”, must be used when constructing a specific training outcome, so as to define precisely what the trainee will be enabled to do.

7.9 In the IMO model course project, the aim is to provide a series of model courses to assist instructors in developing countries to enhance or update the maritime training they provide, and to allow a common minimum standard to be achieved throughout the world. The use of training outcomes is a tangible way of achieving this desired aim.

7.10 As an example, a syllabus in training-outcome format for the subject of ship construction appears in annex A2. This is a standard way of structuring this kind of syllabus. Although, in this case, an outcome for each area has been identified – and could be used in an assessment procedure – this stage is often dropped to obtain a more compact syllabus structure.
8. **Assessment**

Training outcomes describe an outcome which is to be achieved by the trainee. Of equal importance is the fact that such an achievement can be measured **OBJECTIVELY** through an evaluation which will not be influenced by the personal opinions and judgements of the examiner. Objective testing or evaluation provides a sound base on which to make reliable judgements concerning the levels of understanding and knowledge achieved, thus allowing an effective evaluation to be made of the progress of trainees in a course.
## Annex A1 – Preparation checklist

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*Co-ordinator, Lecturers, Instructors, Technicians, Other*
## Annex A1 – Preparation checklist (continued)

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<td>a) Rooms</td>
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<td>Workshop</td>
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<td>Workshop</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Class</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>AVA and Materials</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Class</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Workshop</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Class</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Lab</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Class</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>Other</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Annex A2 – Example of a Model Course syllabus in a subject area

Subject area : Ship construction

Prerequisite : Have a broad understanding of shipyard practice

General aims : Have knowledge of materials used in shipbuilding, specification of shipbuilding steel and process of approval

Textbooks : No specific textbook has been used to construct the syllabus, but the instructor would be assisted in preparation of lecture notes by referring to suitable books on ship construction, such as Ship Construction by Eyres (T12) and Merchant Ship Construction by Taylor (T58)
## Course outline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge, understanding and proficiency</th>
<th>Total hours for each topic</th>
<th>Total hours for each subject area of required performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competence:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 CONTROL TRIM, STABILITY and STRESS</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SHIP CONSTRUCTION, TRIM AND STABILITY</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.1 Shipbuilding materials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.2 Welding</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.3 Bulkheads</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.4 Watertight and weathertight doors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.5 Corrosion and its prevention</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.6 Surveys and dry-docking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.7 Stability</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
Part C3: Detailed teaching syllabus

Introduction
The detailed teaching syllabus is presented as a series of learning objectives. The objective, therefore, describes what the trainee must do to demonstrate that the specified knowledge or skill has been transferred.

Thus each training outcome is supported by a number of related performance elements in which the trainee is required to be proficient. The teaching syllabus shows the Required performance expected of the trainee in the tables that follow.

In order to assist the instructor, references are shown to indicate IMO references and publications, textbooks and teaching aids that instructors may wish to use in preparing and presenting their lessons.

The material listed in the course framework has been used to structure the detailed training syllabus; in particular:

- Teaching aids (indicated by A)
- IMO references (indicated by R), and
- Textbooks (indicated by T)

will provide valuable information to instructors.

Explanation of information contained in the syllabus tables
The information on each table is systematically organized in the following way. The line at the head of the table describes the FUNCTION with which the training is concerned. A function means a group of tasks, duties and responsibilities as specified in the STCW Code. It describes related activities which make up a professional discipline or traditional departmental responsibility on board.

The header of the first column denotes the COMPETENCE concerned. Each function comprises a number of COMPETENCES. Each competence is uniquely and consistently numbered on this model course.

In this function the competence is Control trim, stability and stress. It is numbered 3.1, that is the first competence in Function 3. The term “competence” should be understood as the application of knowledge, understanding, proficiency, skills, experience for an individual to perform a task, duty or responsibility on board in a safe, efficient and timely manner.

Shown next is the required TRAINING OUTCOME. The training outcomes are the areas of knowledge, understanding and proficiency in which the trainee must be able to demonstrate knowledge and understanding. Each COMPETENCE comprises a number of training outcomes. For example, the above competence comprises three training outcomes. The first is concerned with FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SHIP CONSTRUCTION, TRIM AND STABILITY. Each training outcome is uniquely and consistently numbered in this model course. That concerned with fundamental principles of ship construction, trim and stability is uniquely numbered 3.1.1. For clarity, training outcomes are printed in black type on grey, for example TRAINING OUTCOME.
Finally, each training outcome embodies a variable number of Required performances – as evidence of competence. The instruction, training and learning should lead to the trainee meeting the specified Required performance. For the training outcome concerned with the fundamental principles of ship construction, trim and stability there are three areas of performance. These are:

3.1.1.1 Shipbuilding materials
3.1.1.2 Welding
3.1.1.3 Bulkheads

Following each numbered area of Required performance there is a list of activities that the trainee should complete and which collectively specify the standard of competence that the trainee must meet. These are for the guidance of teachers and instructors in designing lessons, lectures, tests and exercises for use in the teaching process. For example, under the topic 3.1.1.1, to meet the Required performance, the trainee should be able to:

- state that steels are alloys of iron, with properties dependent upon the type and amount of alloying materials used
- state that the specification of shipbuilding steels are laid down by classification societies
- state that shipbuilding steel is tested and graded by classification society surveyors who stamp it with approved marks

and so on.

IMO references (Rx) are listed in the column to the right-hand side. Teaching aids (Ax), videos (Vx) and text books (Tx) relevant to the training outcome and Required performances are placed immediately following the TRAINING OUTCOME title.

It is not intended that lessons are organized to follow the sequence of Required performances listed in the Tables. The Syllabus Tables are organized to match with the competence in the STCW Code Table A-II/2. Lessons and teaching should follow college practices. It is not necessary, for example, for shipbuilding materials to be studied before stability. What is necessary is that all of the material is covered and that teaching is effective to allow trainees to meet the standard of the Required performance.
FUNCTION 3: CONTROLLING THE OPERATION OF THE SHIP AND CARE FOR PERSONS ON BOARD AT THE MANAGEMENT LEVEL

COMPETENCE 3.1 Control trim, stability and stress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required performance:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1 Shipbuilding materials (3 hours)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- states that steels are alloys of iron, with properties dependent upon the type and amounts of alloying materials used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- states that the specifications of shipbuilding steels are laid down by classification societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- states that shipbuilding steel is tested and graded by classification surveyors, who stamp it with approved marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- explains that mild steel, graded A – E, is used for most parts of the ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- states why higher tensile steel may be used in areas of high stress, such as the sheer strake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- explains that the use of higher tensile steel in place of mild steel results in saving of weight for the same strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- explains what is meant by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- tensile strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ductility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- hardness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- toughness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- defines strain as extension divided by original length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sketches a stress-strain curve for mild steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- explains:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yield point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ultimate tensile stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- modulus of elasticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- explains that toughness is related to the tendency to brittle fracture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- explains that stress fracture may be initiated by a small crack or notch in a plate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- states that cold conditions increase the chances of brittle fracture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- states why mild steel is unsuitable for the very low temperatures involved in the containment of liquefied gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- lists examples where castings or forgings are used in ship construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- explains the advantages of the use of aluminium alloys in the construction of superstructures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- states that aluminium alloys are tested and graded by classification society surveyors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- explains how strength is preserved in aluminium super structures in the event of fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- describes the special precautions against corrosion that are needed where aluminium alloy is connected to steelwork</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IMO references (Rx) are listed in the column to the right-hand side. Teaching aids (Ax), videos (Vx) and text books (Tx) relevant to the training outcome and Required performances are placed immediately following the TRAINING OUTCOME title.

It is not intended that lessons are organized to follow the sequence of Required performances listed in the Tables. The Syllabus Tables are organized to match with the competence in the STCW Code Table A-II/2. Lessons and teaching should follow college practices. It is not necessary, for example, for shipbuilding materials to be studied before stability. What is necessary is that all of the material is covered and that teaching is effective to allow trainees to meet the standard of the Required performance.
Annex A3 – Example of a lesson plan for annex A2

Subject area : 3.1 Control trim, stability and stress  Lesson Number: 1  Duration : 3 hours

Training Area : 3.1.1 Fundamental principles of ship construction, trim and stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main element</th>
<th>Teaching method</th>
<th>Textbook</th>
<th>IMO reference</th>
<th>A/V aid</th>
<th>Instructor guidelines</th>
<th>Lecture notes</th>
<th>Time (minutes)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1 Shipbuilding materials (3 hours)</strong></td>
<td>Lecture</td>
<td>T12, T58</td>
<td>STCW II/2, A-II/2</td>
<td>V5 to V7</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Compiled by the lecturer</td>
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<tr>
<td>States that steels are alloys of iron, with properties dependent upon the type and amounts of alloying materials used</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States that the specifications of shipbuilding steels are laid down by classification societies</td>
<td>Lecture</td>
<td>T12, T58</td>
<td>STCW II/2, A-II/2</td>
<td>V5 to V7</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Compiled by the lecturer</td>
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<td>Explains that mild steel, graded A to E, is used for most parts of the ship</td>
<td>Lecture</td>
<td>T12, T58</td>
<td>STCW II/2, A-II/2</td>
<td>V5 to V7</td>
<td>A1</td>
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<td>States why higher tensile steel may be used in areas of high stress, such as the sheer strake</td>
<td>Lecture</td>
<td>T12, T58</td>
<td>STCW II/2, A-II/2</td>
<td>V5 to V7</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Compiled by the lecturer</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explains that use of higher tensile steel in place of mild steel results in a saving of weight for the same strength</td>
<td>Lecture</td>
<td>T12, T58</td>
<td>STCW II/2, A-II/2</td>
<td>V5 to V7</td>
<td>A1</td>
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